20 Russia-sanctions packages later, Europe’s problem is timing – not strength
· EUobserverSanctions always come after a conflict has begun — not before. By then, political decisions are made, and escalation is underway. At that stage, even severe economic pressure may no longer change the course
20 Russia-sanctions packages later, Europe’s problem is timing – not strength
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By Mathias Thoenig,
Lausanne
,
On 23 April, the European Union adopted its 20th package of sanctions against Russia and approved a €90bn loan for Ukraine.
Since the start of the war, the EU and its member states have committed hundreds of billions in military, financial, and humanitarian aid.
The costs do not stop there. Europe has also paid a steep price for cutting access to cheap Russian energy—fuelling inflation, slowing growth, and reshaping entire industries.
The human cost is far greater: hundreds of thousands killed or wounded, millions displaced, and vast parts of Ukraine destroyed—some of which may never return to Kyiv’s control.
Faced with this toll, a difficult question emerges: could this have been avoided?
Could earlier, stronger economic pressure have reduced the likelihood of war?
New research suggests this is not as far-fetched as it sounds.
Sanctions: powerful, but poorly-timed
Sanctions have become a central tool of Western foreign policy, targeting finance, trade, energy, and individuals close to the Kremlin. Their aim is clear: to weaken Russia’s ability to wage war and signal resolve.
This is not new.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, sanctions were imposed—but remained limited, and much of the economic slowdown that followed was driven by falling oil prices
Yet there is a fundamental flaw in how sanctions are used.
Sanctions always come after a conflict has begun — not before. By then, political decisions are made, and escalation is underway. At that stage, even severe economic pressure may no longer change the course.
The EU’s 20 successive sanctions packages show persistence. But they also raise a more uncomfortable issue: if sanctions must be repeated and intensified, why are they not deployed earlier, when they might actually prevent war?
Timing is everything.
What if sanctions had come earlier?
In a recent study with colleagues at Sciences Po Paris, supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, we used economic modelling to explore a simple counterfactual: what if the West had issued a credible threat of strong sanctions in 2021, when Russian troops began massing on Ukraine’s borders?
Using historical data on conflicts and global trade networks, we simulated how such a threat would have affected Russia’s cost-benefit calculations.
The quantitative results are striking.
A credible announcement — featuring measures similar to those eventually adopted after the invasion—could have significantly increased the expected cost of war for Russia.
Such threats, however, only work if they are credible—if countries are willing and able to bear the economic cost of enforcing them.
At the time, Europe’s dependence on Russian energy made such credibility difficult to sustain.
In short, earlier sanctions might have significantly reduced Moscow’s incentives to go to war.
This is not hindsight speculation. It is grounded in economic logic: governments, like firms, respond to incentives. When expected costs rise, actions become less attractive.
The analysis also highlights a deeper, more troubling dynamic.
Unintended consequences
After 2014, Ukraine reduced its economic dependence on Russia by reorienting trade towards Europe. This was politically justified — and, in many ways, successful.
But it had an unintended consequence.
By weakening economic ties, it also reduced the direct bilateral economic losses Russia would face in the event of war.
By the early 2020s, the trade-related cost of conflict for Moscow had become relatively limited.
This reflects a long-standing idea in political economy: trade promotes peace in many settings by making conflict more costly. As Montesquieu argued in The Spirit of the Laws, economic interdependence creates mutual incentives to avoid war.
When those ties weaken, so does part of that restraint.
More broadly, policies that reduce economic vulnerability may also weaken deterrence. As economies decouple—through reshoring, trade restrictions, and fragmented supply chains—the economic barriers to conflict erode.
Europe’s response to Russia’s invasion has been strong, unified, and sustained. Sanctions have imposed real costs on the Russian economy. Financial support has helped Ukraine resist.
But this should not obscure a more uncomfortable conclusion: the strategy has been reactive rather than preventive.
By the time sanctions were deployed at scale, the war had already begun.
The lesson for European policymakers is clear. Economic tools are not only instruments of punishment—they can be instruments of deterrence.
But only if they are used early and credibly. This requires a shift in doctrine: Policymakers should move towards pre-announced, contingent sanctions that clearly define the economic consequences of aggression before it occurs, and are tied to well-defined violations of international law.
As the EU rolls out its 20th sanctions package, the question is not only how to maintain pressure, but how to act sooner next time.
Because the real value of sanctions lies not in responding to war, but in preventing it.
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Sanctions always come after a conflict has begun — not before. By then, political decisions are made, and escalation is underway. At that stage, even severe economic pressure may no longer change the course
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Author Bio
Mathias Thoenig is professor of economics at the University of Lausanne. His work examines the links between international trade, conflict, and geopolitical risk, with a focus on policy-relevant analysis.