December 16 and May 9: A recurring pattern of division and destabilisation
by Central Desk · Dispatch News DeskDND Report
The Russia-Pakistan Eurasian Forum 2025 concluded in Moscow, underlining that the global balance of power is shifting toward Eurasia and the Global South, the space for Western hegemony is shrinking, and the media can play a pivotal role in bringing the “truths of every side” to consumers to mitigate narrative-selling by Western powers.
The speakers at the Forum suggested the creation of a Russia–Pakistan Strategic Group and Strategic Dialogue to guide long-term cooperation, along with actionable plans to strengthen media cooperation and expand academic ties and people-to-people exchanges.
The Forum pledged to establish a new economic and financial working group to find workable solutions to impediments faced by the two countries (Pakistan and Russia) in enhancing bilateral trade, people-to-people cooperation, and the exchange of knowledge.
The Forum also decided to establish a joint counter-terrorism program using experience from both countries. It may be mentioned that Pakistan and Russia are members of the SCO, which has its own counterterrorism setup and mechanisms.
The two-day Russia-Pakistan Eurasian Forum 2025, themed “Forging Connectivity and Exploring People-to-People Partnership for a New Era,” brought together lawmakers, officials, experts, and business leaders from Pakistan and Russia, aimed at boosting connectivity through economic corridors, energy projects, and trade, while aligning Pakistan’s regional integration goals with Russia’s Eurasian outreach.
Like BRICS and other Global South forums, this forum also discussed the perceivable collapse of the post-WWII world order and explored opportunities for Russia and Pakistan to derive maximum benefit from the changing scenario.
Russia, which is the only country to have recognized the Afghan Taliban’s interim government, and Pakistan, is facing the brunt of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil with the support of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership. Both countries were present at the forum and were attempting to figure out how to manage the situation without talking about Afghanistan as much as it should have been. Russia maintains that problems related to Afghanistan are beginning to decrease, while Pakistan believes otherwise. These opposing positions of Pakistan and Russia on the Afghan issue could be a reason why terrorism in the region did not come under detailed discussion in this forum that was discussing connectivity and their land connectivity is not possible unless Afghanistan becomes a normal, livable and terrorism free country. It is understandable Pakistani delegates largely avoided engaging on this sensitive subject.
According to pre-forum documents, the main purpose of the Forum was to strengthen bilateral Pakistan–Russia relations through academic exchanges, youth interaction, scientific cooperation, business partnerships, and cultural diplomacy. The emphasis on people-to-people ties reflects a view widely held in Russian and Pakistani policy circles that strong strategic partnerships should be based on Pakistan’s human capital.
The Forum highlighted a simple but significant point: today, Pakistan and Russia are partners of choice, driven not by historical alliances but by modern interests in energy security, diversified markets, regional stability, and economic integration within Greater Eurasia.
Pakistan believes that, with a rapidly digitalizing economy and a strategic location linking South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Islamabad is positioning itself as one of the region’s most dynamic emerging capitals. Pakistan’s expanding manufacturing, IT, renewable energy, and agribusiness sectors backed by a vast consumer base and competitive labor continue to attract growing investor interest from China, the Gulf, Europe, and beyond. Russia, a US$6.92 trillion economy with over US$720 billion in reserves, remains a global powerhouse in energy, minerals, metals, machinery, and advanced technical skills. However, trade potential between Pakistan and Russia remains significantly underutilized, with current bilateral trade hovering just above US$1 billion in 2023 and 2024, far below what their vast consumer markets and strategic connectivity could support.
Russian exports to Pakistan stood at US$782 million, while imports from Pakistan were US$289 million in 2023, highlighting an imbalanced and modest trade relationship, not dissimilar to Russia’s recent (though now rapidly changing) experience with India.
The underutilized Russia–Pakistan trade potential could realistically reach US$5 billion by 2035, reflecting untapped opportunities in sectors such as agriculture, energy, logistics, textiles, defense, IT goods, machinery, pharmaceuticals, and industrial products to narrow the trade gap and boost volumes.
Russia believes that enhanced transport corridors such as the INSTC, the creation and development of the Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan international transport corridor, and cementing Pakistan’s links with the INSTC through improved logistics infrastructure can further accelerate trade flows. This expansion promises new trade opportunities and deeper regional integration. It will enhance Pakistan’s position as a Central Asian trade hub, particularly as it has several Persian Gulf ports and a developing railway network capable of delivering products to landlocked Central Asia.
Russia envisions a reachable regional market that includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, along with China’s Xinjiang Province—a collective market of nearly 100 million people. The potential dynamics of the proposed Trans-Afghan railways, which would bisect the country south–north between Pakistan and Uzbekistan and west–east from Iran to China, could radically alter both South Asian and Central Asian economies, with Pakistan serving as a vital nexus point. However, the experience of the past four decades testifies that development plans involving Afghanistan have met the same fate as projects like CASA-1000, TAPI, and the Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway. Even China is increasingly recognizing the situation and avoiding further investment in Afghanistan’s infrastructure projects.
Russians remain pragmatic about future trade and development projects through Afghanistan. Although both countries signed a deal in 2016 to build the 1,100-kilometer Pakistan Stream natural gas pipeline capable of transporting 12.4 billion cubic meters annually and marking a landmark step in deepening their energy partnership—the project has yet to materialize. Renamed and restructured to navigate geopolitical risks, the pipeline promises to significantly enhance Pakistan’s energy security and regional connectivity, and both countries remain committed to its successful completion.
Meanwhile, Moscow’s plan to revive the Soviet-era Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) in Karachi underscores a broader shift toward long-term industrial partnership. PSM stands as the nation’s largest industrial complex, with a steel and iron production capacity ranging from 1.1 to 5.0 million tonnes annually. Upgrading this single plant would require an investment of approximately US$2 billion, signaling Russia’s readiness to commit billions of dollars to Pakistan. By comparison, the United States has invested about US$1.5 billion, and the United Kingdom—Pakistan’s former colonial ruler—around US$3.3 billion. Russia believes it is likely to surpass both soon and become Pakistan’s leading investor after China and Saudi Arabia.