Splitting the Hard Problem of Consciousness in Two

The hard problem really consists of two very different problems.

Reviewed by Tyler Woods

Key points

• The hard problem of consciousness has framed consciousness studies for a generation.
• This blog explains what the hard problem is and why it needs to be split into two very different problems.
• One problem is the scientific problem, which we call the neurocognitive engineering problem.
• The second problem is the philosophical problem, which we call the enlightenment gap.

This blog was co-authored by Gregg Henriques, Ph.D., and John Vervaeke, Ph.D.

Since the dawn of human consciousness, people have grappled with the problem of what it is and how it works. In academic circles, this is formally known as “the hard problem of consciousness.” David Chalmers provided this formulation about 30 years ago¹, and his analysis has shaped the field of consciousness research ever since.

Prior to Chalmers's work, the problem was often called the explanatory gap. This is because, as shown in the diagram below, science has no good way of explaining how the physical “water” of the brain turns into the “wine” of subjective experience.

On the left is a famous “self-portrait” by the physicist Ernst Mach showing how the world looks from his perspective. On the right is a brain. The explanatory gap is that if we try to look for Mach’s subjective experience from the exterior, scientific point of view, all we find is a brain—and science can’t explain how brains produce subjective experience.

From the Explanatory Gap to the Hard Problem

Chalmers’s work advanced our understanding by dividing the mind into two separate domains. He called the first the psychological mind. It is framed by cognitive psychology and works by processing inputs, computing information, and regulating behavior.

The second is the phenomenal mind, which is the world of subjective experiences, like the smell of a rose. The next diagram depicts Chalmers’s formulation. It says we can understand the brain via standard science, and, following the cognitive revolution, we can extend that to the psychological mind. However, the hard problem remains when we are dealing with the phenomenal mind.

We have used a diagram of our approach to represent the psychological mind, but it could be any “input-output” representation. The point is that to see the hard problem, we need to separate out the easy problems framed by the psychological mind. The question mark shows that Chalmers's analysis raised many questions about the relation between the two minds. Nonetheless, his main conclusion was that the phenomenal mind does not fit into the standard scientific model of the material world.

From Chalmers’s Hard Problem to the Behavior-Mind1-Mind2-Mind3 Problem

We agree with Chalmers that we need to separate the neurocognitive mind from the phenomenal mind and that the latter does not fit neatly with materialism. Nevertheless, there is a problem with Chalmers’s analysis because his framing obscures the fact that there are actually two problems here.

One problem becomes apparent when we zoom in on the relationship between the brain, neurocognition, and phenomenal consciousness from the vantage point of science. The second becomes apparent when we zoom out and consider the larger relationship between science and consciousness from the vantage point of philosophy.

The work Gregg did in A New Synthesis for Solving the Problem of Psychology² enables us to see this difference clearly. It lines up with Chalmers’ analysis regarding the difference between the neurocognitive mind, which Gregg labels Mind1, and the phenomenal mind, which is Mind2. However, because A New Synthesis focused on the problem of psychology rather than the problem of consciousness, it goes farther. It highlights that there is a problem between behaviorism and cognitivism that still has not been solved. We can call this the “Behavior-Mind1” problem.

It also highlights the problems associated with the self-conscious, justifying mind in humans. This is Mind3, which was not a separate domain in Chalmers's analysis. Mind3 connects to propositional language, human culture, and science as a kind of human knowledge system. Importantly, this loops us back to scientific materialism as a kind of justification system for understanding the world. This means that there is a Mind2 to Mind3 problem and, ultimately, a Mind3 to science and philosophy problem through human culture.

A new synthesis labeled the full scope of the problem the Behavior-Mind1-Mind2-Mind3 or BM3 problem. It can be framed as a question: How do we align our scientific understanding of material behaviors, living behaviors, the behaviors of the brain and animal bodies with neurocognitive activity, subjective conscious experience, and self-conscious narratives that ultimately are responsible for generating and validating our scientific understanding in the universe?

With the BM3 problem specified, we can expand the diagram accordingly:

Here, we use the Tree of Knowledge System to frame the BM3 Problem. Doing so shows that the hard problem of consciousness exists inside a larger set of problems. A new synthesis explains why this is the case. In the wake of the scientific Enlightenment, a gap opened up in our knowledge systems. Specifically, as the natural sciences matured, there was no way to effectively place the mind in relationship to matter and scientific knowledge in relationship to subjective and social ways of knowing.

Splitting the Hard Problem in Two

Together, we have developed Extended Naturalism (EN), which is a new approach to the philosophy of mind that we will be laying out in a forthcoming book next year. One of EN’s central arguments is that scholars have misframed the hard problem of consciousness. It has traditionally been seen as a single problem. However, we now know that is a mistake. It actually consists of two different problems that, although related, are nonetheless fundamentally different.

One problem relates to how the brain, neurocognitive activity, and phenomenal experience are interconnected. We call this the neurocognitive engineering problem. It is the scientific aspect of the problem. It aligns nicely with what Anil Seth calls the real problem of consciousness. Given this connection, we can also call this the Real Problem of Mind2.

However, as the problem of psychology and the BM3 problem make clear, there is a larger problem in which the Real Problem of Mind2 is situated. This is a philosophical problem of how to align consciousness with matter and scientific knowledge with subjective and social forms of knowing. We call this the enlightenment gap. It is the problem of how we philosophically frame the neurocognitive engineering problem. This final, simplified diagram drives the point home.

Conclusion

The hard problem of consciousness has framed consciousness studies for a generation. We confess that we both used to believe it was appropriately considered to be a single problem. However, deeper analysis has revealed that it conflates two very different problems. First, there is a zoomed-in, scientific problem that can be considered the neurocognitive engineering problem or, alternatively, the Real Problem of Mind2. Second, there is the zoomed-out philosophical problem. This is the enlightenment gap that resulted in the problem of psychology. Our forthcoming book will explain how EN can effectively resolve the second problem with significant consequences for addressing the first.

John Vervaeke, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at the University of Toronto. He is the author and presenter of the YouTube series, "Awakening from the Meaning Crisis."