Political Hoopla in Pakistan

By Zarmeen Hassan

The Houthi-Saudi conflict has escalated sharply after the informal ceasefire that followed the 2022 UN-brokered truce broke down. In July 2026, the Houthis declared a “maritime embargo” and naval blockade on Saudi-linked vessels in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, citing a Saudi siege on Houthi-controlled areas and an airstrike on Sanaa International Airport that they blamed on Riyadh. The roots run deeper. The killing of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi by Yemeni forces in 2004 gave the movement a new turn, and a decade later the Houthis took over Sanaa.

In 2015, Mohammed bin Salman launched Operation Decisive Storm, and the years of war that followed pushed Yemen to the edge of famine. The conflict is no longer only Yemeni. It is now a front in the wider US-Israeli war on Iran, the Houthis main backer and has turned a local insurgency into a threat to Gulf energy routes. That puts Pakistan in a delicate position: bound to Riyadh by a defense pact, yet already acting as a mediator between Washington and Tehran, and a country that chose neutrality when Saudi Arabia launched its air campaign in Yemen in 2015.

Pakistan has pledged to stand shoulder to shoulder with Riyadh twice, in September 2025 and again in August 2026, yet it has not sent a single reported strike into Yemen. After a deadly attack on Riyadh’s international airport, the Foreign Office reaffirmed its “firm and unshakeable” commitment to Saudi security under the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement. Actions back the words. Reuters, citing a Pakistani official, reported that Pakistan has deployed between 30,000 and 40,000 troops to help defend Saudi land borders and intercept drones and missiles, while the DG ISPR, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, has confirmed that Pakistani forces are on the ground in multiple capacities. Yet the Foreign Office has said no military response to the Houthis is under discussion for now and that Pakistan will act “when time comes”. Islamabad is backing Riyadh in words and deployments while avoiding a Yemen war. This is deliberate strategy, not hesitation.

The Makkah pact’s first meeting with Tehran showed where Pakistan’s value lies. On October 26, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the first high-level contact between Iran and the pact’s members since the war began. Riyadh described the visit as an attempt to open channels and head off renewed escalation, and as support for mediation led by Qatar and Pakistan.

It may be remembered delegations from Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran attended a quadripartite meeting hosted by Secretary-General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaee in Tehran, Iran on October 26, 2026 that was attended by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Turkish MIT Head Ibrahim Kalın, Saudi Arabian Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir.

For Islamabad, the meeting suggests that a defence partnership with Saudi Arabia need not close the door on Iran, and that it is one of the few capitals that can sit at both tables. The four sides agreed to keep talking, yet the Iran-backed Houthis struck Saudi Arabia again soon afterwards. Whether diplomacy can restrain that war is now the question.

The recent meeting in Iran involving Saudi and Pakistani leadership has opened a channel for dialogue. Nevertheless, renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia serve as a reminder of how fragile these diplomatic efforts remain. For Pakistan, the challenge is not only to uphold its defence commitments to Riyadh but also to preserve its diplomatic ties with Tehran as tensions across the region continue to rise. The real test for Islamabad now is whether it can translate its position between competing regional interests into meaningful progress towards stability.