Opinion | A Weakened Iran Won’t Transform the Middle East

However long it takes, Operation Epic Fury will undoubtedly end with something the United States and Israel will call a win. Iran’s military will suffer major setbacks. Its political leadership will be eroded. Its stores of ballistic missiles and drones will be depleted. Its capacity to rebuild a nuclear enrichment program with the prospect of early weaponization will be set back. Its ability to act aggressively in the region via proxies will be severely diminished. These achievements — given the threats to regional stability, Israel and the United States that Iran has posed since 1979 — will be important.

What follows the war is more uncertain. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has talked of bringing about a change in “the balance of power between us and our enemies.” President Trump has talked about the once-in-a-generation opportunity for Iranians to free themselves from an evil regime and for an end to 47 years of radicalizing the Middle East, although he backed off this in recent days Any regime that survives will probably be bent on retribution.

As alluring an objective as transformation might be, U.S. and Israeli leaders need to keep expectations realistic and not assume that the Iran war will produce substantial change in a region that has witnessed far too little of it. History has not been kind to the transformation peddlers in the Middle East. More often than not, ideas about ending conflict, making peace deals and bringing democratic change have withered there.

Sweeping changes seemed possible in recent history. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Cold War ended, Soviet support for regional destabilizers such as Syria, Libya and Iraq weakened. This might have opened the door for moderate states to assert themselves, but the results were minimal, at best. Shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union, President George H.W. Bush talked of a “new chapter in the history of the Middle East,” with real peace, treaties, security, diplomatic relations, trade investment, economic relations, cultural exchanges and tourism — a “Middle East where normal men and women lead normal lives.” But this vision failed to materialize.

In 2011 the Arab Spring elicited fresh hopes of a more democratic region, in which basic rights would be protected and economic development would benefit all. That did not happen. After a promising start in Tunis went off the rails and a leadership change in Egypt kept intact the praetorian state, hopes dissipated. Indeed, the Arab Spring and the overthrow of authoritarians in its wake resulted in a divided and dysfunctional Libya, a more authoritarian Egypt and an even more fractious Yemen.

If transformational change in the region is not in the cards after this war, what might we expect instead? Even if whatever government emerges is so inclined, Iran will be hard-pressed to continue funding its proxy militias. Without Iranian backing of Hezbollah, its viselike grip over the Lebanese state will probably continue to weaken. Iran’s support for the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza may wane, but the Houthis will still be able to act independently in a divided country. Gaza will most likely remain geographically split, dysfunctional and sporadically violent, with Hamas remaining in control of parts of the territory.

As other Persian Gulf states assess their defensive requirements and consider whether the war has hastened or slowed the process of normalization with Israel, they will breathe a collective sigh of relief as the threat from Iran is diminished. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, however, geography is destiny. The Persian Gulf states’ proximity to Iran will continue to make them vulnerable. They will, of necessity, remain dependent on Washington for security but will strive to define their ties to a new Iran in whatever form it emerges.

The threat of further conflict will remain. Syria is still a state in the making, where internal pressure from ISIS remnants and external pressure from Turkey and Israel could yet spiral into conflict. Israel’s eschewing of deterrence in favor of military pre-emption since the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, suggests that it will continue to act immediately whenever it perceives an emerging threat, especially if its current hard-right government stays in power.

The end of this war is unlikely to spur new efforts at Arab-Israeli peacemaking, just as the end of the war in Gaza has not yet led to any serious pathway to peace. The Palestinian national movement is divided and dysfunctional, with weak and aging leadership. Hamas is down but not out. In the wake of Oct. 7, Israel has no leaders willing to compromise with the Palestinians. Israel’s annexationist policies on the West Bank continue to narrow the prospects for peace.

There seems to be little room for major political change or reformation elsewhere, too. Arab leaders — such as those in the six Gulf monarchies and Egypt, Jordan and Morocco — are tied to the status quo, ruling in systems that are undemocratic, largely authoritarian and seriously unequal.

Nor will the underlying problems in the region change. Corruption, crony capitalism and gender inequality are rife in a part of the world otherwise infused with enormous wealth and possibility. Water and food insecurity threaten growing populations. Youth unemployment and inadequate housing remain challenging.

This administration has demonstrated no real interest in a sustained effort to advance peacemaking or promote democracy or economic equality in the Middle East. America’s leaders seem to lack the vision, determination and commitment to the hard work necessary.

A U.S.-Israeli military victory in Iran and the weakening of its proxies would certainly calm the waters of immediate conflict. Markets will improve and the global oil picture will brighten over time. These are no small matters. The United States can turn its attention to Russia and the war in Ukraine and focus on possible threats by China to Taiwan.

Still, it is wise to recall the wisdom of the satirist Ambrose Bierce, who defined peace as “a period of cheating between two periods of fighting.” How long before the cheating resumes in this broken region will depend on the willingness of its leaders and those outside the Middle East to not walk away but to work on real transformations: to lasting peace, respect for human rights and economic benefits for all.

Daniel C. Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel, is a professor at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. Aaron David Miller, a former State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator, is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Source photographs by Chasseur de Couleurs, Roc Canals/Getty Images

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.

Related Content