Nigeria’s strategic response to an increasingly dangerous neighbourhood, By Simbo Olorunfemi

In the two situations, Nigeria has acted in consonance with the constitutional order and relevant international legal protocols, which is a testament to the steady hands and clarity of thought behind guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy exertions.

Nigeria’s swift and successful response to the call for help by the elected government in Benin has not only shored up Nigeria’s image, but it has also sent a strong signal across and beyond the region that Nigeria is not idling, but alert and ready to act decisively to safeguard its national interest in navigating around the challenges in its increasingly dangerous neighbourhood, and doing so on its own terms.

“As several of my colleagues in the region remind me, we are the hegemon, whether we admit it or not. And global politics works almost like physics, with polarity, ordering principles, distribution of power, balancing, etc. Nigeria has never had expansionist tendencies, never been threatening towards our neighbours, and always chosen the path of peace and conciliation.” – Yusuf Tuggar

When in January this year, Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Tuggar, wrote an article titled, “Foreign policy and the path to peace in a dangerous neighbourhood,” I doubt that he foresaw that his work would eventually turn out to be a seminal one, given the series of occurrences that have taken place since then in Nigeria’s neighbourhood, making foreign relations a front-burner issue, more than it has been at any other time.

In the article, Tuggar made the point that the Nigerian constitution makes it clear why “any responsible Nigerian government should be concerned when neighbours are governed without a constitution or codified rules.” He argued that while the sovereignty of our neighbours is up to them, allowing them to grant powers to “whatever governing structures they deem fit…when our Interdependence Sovereignty overlaps, we equally have a right to exercise control over our borders in those cases where neighbours face insurgencies that significantly compromise territorial integrity and state authority.”

That, to me, was Tuggar laying down the marker about a year ago, that given the factors that have played out in recent years and made the neighbourhood increasingly dangerous, the Tinubu administration, which has come “at a time when an interlocking suite of occurrences,” like the implosion of Libya, failure of the EU Sahel Strategy, terrorism and criminal gangs, effects of climate change and population explosion that have compromised the security of the neighbourhood, retains the right to maintain vigilance over events across national borders and the neighbourhood, to ensure that the country’s territorial integrity is not compromised and its sovereignty is guaranteed.

Indeed, the neighbourhood has never been easy, though. Of late, it has, however, become like a hostile ring road, with coups in different countries, the closure of borders, breakaway of three countries (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) from ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and even contestation over airspace, which are pointers to a more fractious neighbourhood than we have witnessed at any other time. Terrorism and violent extremism have gained a stronger foothold in the region, stemming from the collapse of Libya, and the outflow of weapons and fighters, leading to the entrenched insecurity in the Sahel, that has shadowy figures operating in situ with a range of state and non-state actors.

Relying on two official requests from the Beninoise government, President Tinubu dispatched military jets and ground troops to help secure strategic locations and shore up President Talon’s government, effectively foiling the coup attempt. This might have read as textbook regionalism: respond to a formal request from the legitimate government, defend constitutional and relevant ECOWAS Protocols, and deter further copycat military adventurism taking root in the region.

Such is the situation that what was once considered a security buffer for Nigeria has now become a pipeline through which arms and terrorists make their way in through porous borders. To the North-West of the country, Niger is now under the control of a junta that is reading from a different page from that of Abuja. Chad is in a fragile state, dealing with its own transitions, while Cameroon appears weighed down by internal contradictions, which might explain its seeming ambivalence towards full-throated cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram and ISWAP. To the West, the Benin Republic, which had for a while stood as a beacon of democracy in the neighbourhood, has now come under the cosh with the recent coup attempt in the country.

That putsch in Benin was obviously the tipping point for Nigeria, judging by the swift and clinical response on the part of the Nigerian government. Relying on two official requests from the Beninoise government, President Tinubu dispatched military jets and ground troops to help secure strategic locations and shore up President Talon’s government, effectively foiling the coup attempt. This might have read as textbook regionalism: respond to a formal request from the legitimate government, defend constitutional and relevant ECOWAS Protocols, and deter further copycat military adventurism taking root in the region.

Nigeria’s swift response sits squarely with Article 25 of the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, which empowers ECOWAS to deploy civilian and military forces “to maintain or restore peace” when constitutional order is threatened. This proactive provision authorises “all forms of intervention,” from diplomacy to standby forces, which applies in the coup scenario, and was met by ECOWAS with these prescribed actions in the two statements it issued on 7th December.

While some have brought up comparisons between Nigeria’s response in the case of Niger and that of Benin, it is not simply a statement on a hierarchy of risks or a calculus of proximity, but different approaches to situations that are not the same. A situation of fait accompli, as witnessed in Niger, is different from that in Benin. ECOWAS protocols also provide for them differently. Articles 45-48 of the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance outline a cascade of measures: the immediate suspension of offending states, economic sanctions (trade bans, asset freezes), travel restrictions, and, as a last resort, “any other sanction including the use of armed force.” The protocol mandates the restoration of the ousted leader within six months, or face isolation. It is those provisions that guided Nigeria’s response in the Niger scenario, while the aforementioned Article 25 of the 1999 ECOWAS guided the response in the Benin situation.

As Minister Yusuf Tuggar explained, “the fulcrum of the Tinubu administration’s foreign policy is Strategic Autonomy, providing us with the clarity to engage with any and all nations on the basis of our national interests and not those of others. As a nation, Nigeria is adult and sophisticated enough to deal with countries without being unduly influenced, because that has been part of our historical and civic tradition.”

In the two situations, Nigeria has acted in consonance with the constitutional order and relevant international legal protocols, which is a testament to the steady hands and clarity of thought behind guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy exertions. Worthy of mention is the fact that Benin Republic is not just Nigeria’s neighbour, it has been described as “a major trade corridor, a customs mirror, and a political barometer for the coastal flank of West Africa.” It is about Nigeria meeting principle with pragmatism, as has been enunciated in its doctrine of strategic autonomy. A successful coup in Benin, after that of Niger would have signalled the normalisation of putschism from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea, which is not in Nigeria’s national interest.

As Minister Yusuf Tuggar explained, “the fulcrum of the Tinubu administration’s foreign policy is Strategic Autonomy, providing us with the clarity to engage with any and all nations on the basis of our national interests and not those of others. As a nation, Nigeria is adult and sophisticated enough to deal with countries without being unduly influenced, because that has been part of our historical and civic tradition.”

The challenge has been about how Nigeria secures itself in a region where the state is in retreat and armed non-state actors are on the march. Nigeria’s swift and successful response to the call for help by the elected government in Benin has not only shored up Nigeria’s image, but it has also sent a strong signal across and beyond the region that Nigeria is not idling, but alert and ready to act decisively to safeguard its national interest in navigating around the challenges in its increasingly dangerous neighbourhood, and doing so on its own terms.

Simbo Olorunfemi is a specialist on Nigeria’s foreign policy, a communications consultant, and managing editor of Africa Enterprise. Email: Editor@enterpriseafrica.ng