'A common enemy, but not a common project': A fragile jihadist-separatist alliance in Mali

Jihadist fighters in Mali on Thursday called for a nationwide uprising against the ruling military junta, as they tightened a blockade on the capital, Bamako, following coordinated attacks alongside Tuareg separatists. 

The appeal came from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an affiliate of al Qaeda. It follows a series of joint offensives launched on Saturday that struck multiple towns and military positions across the country and reached as far as Bamako, the capital – marking the most serious escalation in Mali since 2012. 

In a statement, JNIM called for a “common front”, uniting “political parties, the national armed forces, religious authorities, traditional leaders and all components of Malian society” to “bring down the junta” and pave the way for what it described as a “peaceful and inclusive transition”.

The developments came as Mali held a funeral for defence minister Sadio Camara, who was killed last weekend in an attack on his residence in Kati, a junta stronghold around 20 kilometres from the capital. 

A key architect of closer ties between Bamako and Russia, Camara was widely regarded as one of the regime’s most influential figures. His death has intensified pressure on the military junta led by Assimi Goïta, despite renewed backing from Moscow. 

An alliance of convenience 

At the core of the offensive is an unlikely partnership between JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg movement that has retaken Kidal, a long-contested stronghold in the north. 

The scale and coordination of the assaults suggest months of preparation. Analysts say the alliance is driven by pragmatism: the FLA brings local legitimacy and territorial roots, while JNIM provides the firepower and operational expertise needed to challenge the state. 

“The coordination between these groups shows months of planning,” said Nina Wilen, director of the Africa Programme at the Egmont Institute. “This goes much further than what we’ve seen in the past.” 

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For Wassim Nasr, FRANCE 24’s expert on jihadist networks, the shift is particularly significant. “They are not just fighting side by side anymore,” he said. “They are operating together.” 

Shared enemy, different aims 

Despite their cooperation on the battlefield, the alliance remains fragile. The two movements are divided by fundamentally different objectives. 

JNIM seeks to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law across Mali and the wider Sahel. The FLA, by contrast, is pursuing independence – or at least autonomy – for the Tuareg in the north. 

“They have a common enemy, but not a common project,” Wilen said. 

The divide is both political and ideological. “There are major differences,” said Djenabou Cissé, a defence specialist at the French think tank Foundation for Strategic Research. “JNIM is driven by a religious project, while the FLA is seeking self-determination. One is multinational and multi-ethnic; the other is rooted in a specific people.” 

Those differences are already visible. After seizing Kidal, Tuareg separatists signalled plans to expand their control across northern Mali. 

Mali's army and its Russian mercenary allies surrendered camp Tessalit, a strategic northern military stronghold, to armed rebels on Friday.  

An official from the FLA told AFP that troops and mercenaries at the "super-camp" had "just surrendered as they did in Kidal", referring to a key northern town taken last weekend.

JNIM, meanwhile, has focused on isolating the capital, reviving a strategy aimed at weakening the authorities by strangling supply routes and fuelling public discontent. 

According to Vincent Hugeux, journalist and lecturer at Science Po, such tactics are designed less to seize power outright than to erode it.  

“In reality, both the rebels and the Islamists know that they lack the resources – in terms of both manpower and equipment – to hold a capital like Bamako in the long term.”  

JNIM’s longer-term aim may instead be to shape the political landscape by encouraging the emergence of a regime more aligned with its demands, he said. 

Echoes of past alliances 

The current alignment between jihadist fighters and Tuareg separatists echoes developments in the early 2010s, when northern Mali saw similar, short-lived cooperation between rebel and Islamist groups. 

At the time, Tuareg separatists from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) joined forces with Islamist factions, including Ansar Dine, as they seized control of much of the north. Their advance towards Bamako prompted France to intervene in 2013 with Operation Serval, halting the offensive and restoring state control over key areas. 

There are also longstanding personal ties between the two camps. Iyad Ag Ghali, now head of JNIM, was once a leading figure in Tuareg rebellions. Yet cooperation has historically been tempered by rivalry, particularly over territory and resources in northern and central Mali. 

A volatile outlook 

The Tuareg, a historically nomadic people spread across Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya and Burkina Faso, have long complained of marginalisation. Their aim remains the creation of an independent Azawad in northern Mali. 

By contrast, JNIM continues to expand its reach across the Sahel and is engaged in a violent rivalry with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. 

As those regional dynamics continue to unfold, the situation on the ground remains uncertain. Roads into Bamako are increasingly being cut off after JNIM earlier announced its intention to impose a blockade, tightening pressure on the capital and raising fears of a prolonged siege.  

According to a JNIM spokesperson, civilians inside the city are still allowed to leave.