Commentary: Sheikh Hasina’s death sentence raises tensions in Bangladesh-India ties at a crucial time
The lead-up to Bangladesh’s February elections will be a test of caretaker leader Muhammad Yunus’ leadership, says Rishi Gupta from the Asia Society Policy Institute.
by Rishi Gupta · CNA · JoinRead a summary of this article on FAST.
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NEW DELHI: There is a certain irony in Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina being sentenced to death in absentia by the court she created to try war criminals.
Many Bangladeshis celebrated the Nov 17 verdict, handed down for her 2024 crackdown on student protestors that left up to 1,400 dead, calling it a historic moment of accountability for her 15-year authoritarian reign. But they should not wait for an execution to turn the page and start the country’s new chapter.
Following the verdict, Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, formally requested her extradition from India, where Hasina fled to in August 2024. The two countries have an extradition treaty in place since 2013.
On Wednesday (Nov 26), India said it was examining the request, but it is unlikely that Delhi will respond any time soon and even less likely it will accede to it.
Her fate may play a crucial role in the upcoming national elections, the first to be held post-uprising, as political parties will likely adopt rhetoric that portrays India in a grim light for sheltering Hasina. Equally important will be whether the February 2026 elections are fair and credible – an essential test of democracy and one which Hasina ultimately failed.
BANGLADESH’S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE
One question is whether Yunus risks continuing a vicious circle of democratic decay in Bangladesh.
The July Charter, which includes proposed reforms in the government and governance aimed at ensuring institutional and political transparency, will be put to a referendum on the same day in February when Bangladeshis go to the polls.
But this has been undermined by his blanket ban on activity from Hasina’s political party, the Awami League, preventing it from contesting the upcoming elections. This threatens a repeat of Hasina’s use of state machinery to weaken arch-rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the 2018 and 2024 general elections.
While the Awami League is severely weakened and has had to send its operations underground, the party remains intact and continues to put pressure on Yunus.
Hasina’s son has warned of massive violent protests if the Awami League is not allowed to contest next February. By October, at least 3,000 leaders and activists from the Awami League and its affiliated organisations were detained and arrested on various charges, including those of inciting for political demonstrations.
CLOSER TIES WITH PAKISTAN
Upholding this ban on the Awami League through the election would not be just a change of power for Bangladesh, but also a shift in the national narrative.
A victory from the BNP or religious party Jamaat-e-Islami may bring about a “nooton Bangladesh” (new Bangladesh), whose foundations are no longer rooted in the 1971 war for independence against West Pakistan. Earlier this year, anti-Hasina protestors in Dhaka demolished several monuments commemorating the 1971 war, including the personal residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s former president and Sheikh Hasina’s father.
Hasina’s ouster reflects a disillusionment with the version of Bangladesh’s national narrative that she and the Awami League have perpetuated, which frames the party as the direct heir to the 1971 independence movement.
In casting this version of history aside, protesters have made Bangladesh’s narrative less about opposing Pakistan. But this also opens room for conservative parties like the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami to campaign on less inclusive platforms. Ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan have already warmed since the 2024 protests.
TENSE TIME FOR BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS
All this will have far-reaching implications for Bangladesh’s foreign policy and the regional balance of power.
For India, the 1971 war against West Pakistan was a major win for its strategic positioning and set the stage for friendly relations under Awami League leadership. With the new Bangladeshi leadership on the horizon, New Delhi will need to adopt a more cautious and multiparty approach towards Dhaka.
Hasina’s continued residency in India will be a flashpoint. It’s worth noting that it was the Bangladeshi Army that asked Hasina to resign and gave her a safe passage by military helicopter to India.
Will India now extradite Hasina to Bangladesh? It is unlikely, given she is now facing a death sentence.
If India is taking time, it is to explore legal options and appropriate language to respond. There is language in the treaty with Bangladesh and in India’s own law to refuse extradition, such as if the charges were politically motivated or brought in bad faith.
However, refusal to comply will have implications. India would lose a key strategic space and goodwill in its backyard that is very close to the Bay of Bengal, and to parties that pose security challenges to Delhi, including Pakistan and China. It will also impact people-to-people ties that, under Sheikh Hasina, remained in India’s favour.
A TEST FOR MUHAMMAD YUNUS
Considering all this, the months ahead will be a test of Yunus’ leadership.
He is favoured by the political wing that installed him as the leader after Hasina, yet continues to face opposition from an underground and banned Awami League. He will have to weigh calls to reinstate the party against the utility that comes with continuing Bangladesh’s cycle of muting political opposition.
In the meantime, Yunus has the challenge of navigating increasingly tense relations with India as calls for Hasina’s repatriation mount and the national narrative shifts.
Between Bangladesh’s rapprochement with China-aligned Pakistan and tensions with its next-door neighbour India, the balance of power in South Asia is poised for significant change.
Bangladesh is not an isolated example of shifting alliances in the subcontinent. From the communists in Nepal or the Rajapaksas in Sri Lanka – which both had their leaders ousted in recent years – to the current Muizzu administration in the Maldives, almost all have attempted to shift their foreign policy from India to China first.
What helps China in these countries is that it does not carry the burden of history, whereas almost all of India’s neighbours have disputes with Delhi.
Rishi Gupta is Assistant Director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. Views are personal.
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