Commentary: Deepening Iran war and Hormuz crisis have left India sidelined
The US-Israel war on Iran has undermined New Delhi’s delicate balancing of ties in the Middle East, says RSIS’ Sinderpal Singh.
by Sinderpal Singh · CNA · JoinRead a summary of this article on FAST.
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SINGAPORE: Iran’s relationship with India has been sorely tested amid its conflict with the US and Israel.
On Monday (May 4), Iran launched a drone attack on a UAE oil port, setting it ablaze and injuring three Indian nationals. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned the attack in a post on X. “Targeting civilians and infrastructure is unacceptable,” he wrote.
Two weeks earlier, Iran fired at two Indian-flagged vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, shortly after reversing a decision to reopen the waterway. The attack was a significant departure from the Indian government’s earlier success at negotiating safe passage for a few Indian-flagged vessels through the strait.
Though there were no reported casualties, the Indian government summoned the Iranian ambassador in New Delhi to express “deep concern” over the incident and urge protection of Indian vessels plying the strait.
With the US-Iran stalemate over the Strait of Hormuz showing no signs of easing soon, India is at risk of further collateral damage in the coming weeks or months.
INDIA’S BALANCING ACT
Before conflict broke out in February, Indian diplomacy in the Middle East was viewed as a successful balancing act between several countries that are at odds with each other.
India, under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government since 2014, has expanded cooperation with Israel while deepening links with Gulf states such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman.
Simultaneously, it has built upon its historically close ties with Iran, despite pressure from successive US administrations and Iran’s deteriorating relations with Israel and several Gulf states in recent years.
However, India decided not to criticise Israel and the US when they launched a joint attack on Iran on Feb 28. Then on Mar 4, India again decided not to criticise the US for sinking an Iranian frigate as it returned from a naval exercise organised by India.
This led to a significant amount of criticism from analysts and opposition politicians in India. There is public perception that Indian leaders do not want to upset US President Donald Trump and thus have abandoned an old and trusted ally.
In addition, it is possible that the Indian government assumed the conflict would be short-lived. Maintaining a position of silence would be in India’s interest when weighed against the potential repercussions of incurring Mr Trump’s wrath.
Despite backlash over India’s apparent acquiescence to the US, Iran has indicated that India remains a friendly country. Delhi’s seeming unwillingness to publicly offer support for Tehran does not seem to have invited any clear consequence.
SIDELINED IN OWN BACKYARD
India has largely been sidelined from a conflict in a region where it once enjoyed an impressive and growing network of relations. This marginalisation seems even more stark when contrasted with Pakistan’s high-profile mediation role in the Iran war.
From India’s view, Pakistan could serve as a proxy for an increased Chinese role in the Middle East post-conflict. Nonetheless, many in Delhi believe that the peacemaker role could be a poisoned chalice for Pakistan because Washington and Tehran could blame and punish Islamabad in the event of a breakdown in talks.
In addition, Pakistan also must contend with its precarious position in relation to its mutual security pact with Saudi Arabia. On Apr 28, Gulf leaders met in Saudi Arabia to discuss the ongoing war, reaffirming that an attack on one state would be considered an attack on all. If Saudi Arabia were to launch a response to Iran attacks in self-defence, Pakistan may be obligated to come to its aid.
In the more immediate period, the Indian economy looks to be significantly affected by the continued blockade of the Straits of Hormuz. Specifically, India is facing a significant shortfall of energy and fertiliser imports that come from the Persian Gulf.
It has attempted to meet this shortfall by buying increasing amounts of Russian crude oil, but its key issue remains the gap in liquified petroleum gas (LPG), which is used in everyday cooking.
Unlike crude oil, it has become difficult to diversify new sources of LPG. Ninety per cent of India’s LPG shipments come via the Strait of Hormuz. Prices of LPG cylinders have risen rapidly, and together with higher fertiliser prices, will cause a knock-on effect on food prices.
Delhi’s delicate balancing of multiple relations in the region has been undermined by the Iran war. It has attempted to redress the impact on its standing in the Middle East through official visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia in April.
While it can counsel all sides to end the conflict and advise Gulf states against retaliation against Iran, structurally speaking, there is little India can do to make itself more relevant in this crisis.
Dr Sinderpal Singh is Assistant Director and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme and Regional Security Architecture Programme, at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
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