Pakistan’s Constitutional counter-revolution: The steady march towards centralized authority

Girdhari Lal Raina, Ex-MLC, J&K

Pakistan today stands at a constitutional crossroads. Areas of Jammu Kashmir under its illegal occupation (POJK ) are on the boil. People have risen in revolt. The army is using brute force to crush the uprising. Balochistan and Khayber Pakhthoon khwa have resorted to armed rebellion.

Reports surrounding a proposed 28th Constitutional Amendment, under these conditions, have ignited intense political debate, not merely because of the specific measures being discussed but because of what they collectively signify. The proposals reportedly seek to roll back key aspects of provincial autonomy established under the landmark 18th Amendment, restructure revenue-sharing mechanisms in favor of the federal government, raise the voting age from eighteen to twenty-five years, and redraw provincial boundaries while tightening Islamabad’s control over peripheral regions.

Whether these proposals are enacted in their entirety or modified during the legislative process, they must be viewed against the backdrop of a broader constitutional transformation that has unfolded in Pakistan over the last two years. The proposed 28th Amendment is not an isolated event. Rather, it appears to be the latest step in a systematic process of political centralization that began with the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments and has steadily altered the balance of power among the judiciary, elected institutions, provinces, and the military establishment.

The significance of the current debate can only be understood by recalling the importance of the 18th Amendment, passed in 2010. Widely regarded as one of Pakistan’s most consequential democratic reforms, the amendment sought to address longstanding grievances arising from excessive concentration of power in Islamabad. It transferred substantial authority to the provinces, giving them greater control over sectors such as education, health, culture, and local governance. It strengthened the federal character of the state and reflected an understanding that Pakistan’s ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity could be better managed through decentralization rather than central control.

For many observers, the 18th Amendment represented an attempt to move beyond Pakistan’s long history of centralized governance, military interventions, and provincial alienation. It sought to create a more balanced federation in which power was shared rather than monopolized.

The proposals reportedly being considered under the 28th Amendment strike directly at this framework. Returning devolved subjects such as education and health to the federal government would effectively reverse one of the most important pillars of the 18th Amendment. Advocates may argue that such a move would improve administrative efficiency and ensure uniform national standards. Yet critics contend that it would weaken provincial governments, reduce local accountability, and concentrate decision-making power in Islamabad.

Equally significant is the reported proposal to revisit the National Finance Commission Award, the mechanism through which federal revenues are distributed among provinces. Financial autonomy is the lifeblood of political autonomy. Provincial powers become largely symbolic if provinces lack control over adequate financial resources. Any restructuring that increases federal discretion over revenue distribution is therefore likely to be viewed by provincial stakeholders as an erosion of the federal compact itself.

Perhaps the most controversial proposal is the suggestion that the voting age be raised from eighteen to twenty-five years. Such a measure would disenfranchise millions of young Pakistanis at a stroke. In a country that youth constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population, excluding citizens between eighteen and twenty-five years, from electoral participation would represent a profound contraction of democratic rights.

The symbolism of such a move would be difficult to ignore. Across much of the democratic world, governments are seeking ways to encourage greater youth participation in public life. Many countries have debated lowering the voting age to sixteen. Pakistan would be moving in precisely the opposite direction. Critics argue that such a proposal reflects not confidence in democratic participation but anxiety about the political preferences of younger voters who are increasingly connected, politically aware, and willing to challenge established power structures.

The reported plans to redraw provincial boundaries and create smaller administrative units add another layer of complexity. Proponents may present such changes as efforts to improve governance and administrative responsiveness. Yet boundary reorganization in ethnically and politically sensitive regions is rarely viewed as a purely technical exercise. Questions inevitably arise regarding political representation, resource allocation, demographic balances, and the redistribution of power.

Particularly noteworthy are discussions regarding the tighter integration of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan into federal structures. Such measures would not merely have domestic administrative implications but could also carry regional and geopolitical consequences. More importantly, they reinforce the broader perception that the direction of constitutional change is toward greater centralization rather than greater autonomy.

Viewed in isolation, each of these proposals can be debated on its own merits. Viewed collectively, however, they reveal a larger pattern.

The process arguably began with the 26th Constitutional Amendment. By restructuring the Judicial Commission of Pakistan and increasing the role of political actors in judicial appointments, the amendment altered the traditional balance between the judiciary and the executive. Critics argued that it weakened judicial independence and reduced the judiciary’s ability to function as an effective check on government authority.

The 27th Amendment went considerably further. It established a Federal Constitutional Court, significantly reducing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over constitutional matters. It empowered the executive to transfer judges between courts and created mechanisms that opponents argue could be used to pressure or sideline independent-minded members of the judiciary. Simultaneously, it formalized the position of Chief of Defence Forces, permanently occupied by the Army Chief, thereby institutionalizing the military’s already dominant role within Pakistan’s power structure.

The cumulative effect of these changes has been profound. First came the dilution of judicial independence. Then came the restructuring of constitutional adjudication and the consolidation of military authority. Now come proposals aimed at reducing provincial autonomy, strengthening federal control over resources, and potentially narrowing democratic participation.

Many analysts describe this process as a constitutional counter-revolution. The phrase may sound dramatic, but it captures an important reality. Constitutional systems are built upon a delicate balance among competing centers of power. Federalism prevents excessive centralization. Judicial independence restrains executive overreach. Broad electoral participation ensures democratic legitimacy. When all three are simultaneously weakened, the nature of the political system itself begins to change.

Supporters of these reforms argue that Pakistan faces extraordinary governance challenges that require stronger central institutions. They contend that fragmented authority has often hindered effective policymaking and national coordination. Yet history repeatedly demonstrates that stability achieved through concentration of power is often temporary. Durable stability emerges when institutions enjoy legitimacy, when provinces feel adequately represented, when courts are trusted to act independently, and when citizens believe their voices matter.

The fundamental question confronting Pakistan is therefore not whether a particular amendment should pass or fail. It is whether the country wishes to deepen the principles of federal democracy or gradually replace them with an increasingly centralized political order. The debate over the proposed 28th Amendment is ultimately a debate about the future character of the Pakistani state itself.

The trajectory established by the 26th and 27th Amendments suggests that the stakes are far larger than any single constitutional provision. What is unfolding is a struggle over the distribution of power within the republic. If current trends continue, Pakistan may emerge with stronger central institutions ( read Pakistan Army) but weaker constitutional safeguards, diminished provincial autonomy, reduced judicial independence, and a narrower democratic space.

That would mark not merely another constitutional amendment but a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between the state and its citizens.

(GL Raina is a former Member of the Legislative Council of Jammu Kashmir and spokesperson of BJP JK-UT)