Kashmir Was Not Created by the National Conference

The Abdullah legacy is not Kashmir’s history.

Former MLC GL Raina

Chief spokesperson of National conference and MLA zadibal Tanvir Sadiq’s recent statement is not merely ignorant; it is profoundly insulting to the dignity, memory and historical identity of Kashmiris. The backlash it has provoked across sections of Kashmir society is therefore hardly surprising.

The deeper problem, however, is not one ill-considered statement by one National Conference leader. It reflects a much larger political habit: the attempt to present the history of Kashmir through the narrow prism of the Abdullah family and the National Conference, as though Kashmir’s identity, culture and political consciousness began with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.

Kashmiris were elegantly, confidently and decently dressed decades before Sheikh Abdullah was born. Kashmir possessed a sophisticated social, cultural, intellectual and economic life long before the Abdullah family entered politics. Its history did not begin in 1931, and certainly did not begin with the National Conference.

Yet the NC repeatedly behaves as though it possesses a proprietary right over Kashmir’s history and identity. This is the real arrogance of the Abdullah legacy. It does not merely seek political power; it seeks to monopolise the narrative of Kashmir itself.

It is time that this mythology was challenged.

The Abdullah transformation

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah undeniably became the most consequential political figure in twentieth-century Kashmir. But historical importance does not grant immunity from historical scrutiny.

The period after 1931 saw the rapid transformation of Kashmir’s political landscape. Abdullah emerged as the dominant political force and ultimately constructed an extraordinary concentration of political authority around himself and his organisation.

His supporters have traditionally presented this history as an uncomplicated struggle for liberation and social justice.

The other side deserves to be heard.

Muslim political opponents of the National Conference, including those associated with alternative religious and political currents, were not simply irrelevant reactionaries. Full integrationists , Pro-Pakistan voices, advocates of independence, left-wing critics and independent journalists represented genuine strands of political opinion within Kashmir.

Many faced repression, censorship, intimidation or political exclusion.

Sheikh Abdullah’s administration (1947–1953) systematically targeted and suppressed pro-India and pro-integration voices within the Kashmir Valley itself.In the valley, anyone who advocated for complete constitutional merger with India, questioned J&K’s special autonomous status under Article 370, or challenged the NC’s absolute political monopoly was treated as an existential threat to the administration. This suppression inside the valley manifested through specific political, legislative, and security mechanisms.

The Mirwaiz establishment and its supporters also experienced particularly bitter political confrontation with the National Conference. Downtown Srinagar became an arena of intense political contestation, while institutions associated with Abdullah’s opponents were subjected to political pressure.

The crucial point is this: Kashmiri Muslims did not unanimously speak through Sheikh Abdullah.

Nor did Kashmiri Hindus.

Nor did the National Conference represent every Kashmiri aspiration.

That uncomfortable truth has too often been buried beneath decades of political hagiography.

The Kashmir that existed before the Abdullahs

An honest examination of Kashmir’s past reveals a far more complex society than the simplistic political narratives that have dominated public discourse in recent times.

Before 1931, for example, organised Hindu-Muslim communal riots were not the defining feature of everyday life in the Valley. Popular unrest was frequently driven by economic exploitation, agrarian distress, taxation, forced labour and oppressive administration.

That does not mean Kashmir had no religious conflict. It certainly did. The Mughal and Afghan periods witnessed episodes of intense sectarian violence, particularly between Shia and Sunni communities, as well as state persecution of Kashmiri Pandits under particular rulers and officials.

But For centuries, ordinary Kashmiris lived through extensive social and economic interdependence. Muslims and Hindus worked together, traded together and shared aspects of a remarkably rich cultural life. Even during periods of oppression, the relationship between communities was considerably more complicated than the communal binaries subsequently constructed by political movements.

The horrific disturbances associated with figures such as Mahtavi Khan demonstrate another important reality: communal and sectarian violence could emerge when political authority weakened and extremist forces attempted to capture society. Such episodes should be remembered, but they should not be selectively weaponised to rewrite the entire history of Kashmir.

Likewise, the overthrow of Afghan rule in 1819 cannot be understood simply as a Hindu-Muslim confrontation. Kashmiri opposition to Afghan oppression included cooperation across communities. Pandit Birbal Dhar’s efforts to seek Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s intervention were aided by Muslim allies and local chieftains like Qadus Gojwari, Sultan Khan, the Muslim chieftain of the princely state of Bhimbar and Malik Anwar Chowdhury and the other Border Chieftains.

This history of cooperation deserves as much attention as the episodes of conflict.

The Pandit “privilege” myth

Another convenient political narrative has been the portrayal of Kashmiri Pandits as one uniformly privileged community benefiting from state power. The historical reality was much more complicated.

While some Pandits occupied positions in administration, the overwhelming majority of ordinary Pandits were neither wealthy nor powerful. Rural and lower-income Pandit families experienced poverty, economic stagnation and the same devastating famines and underdevelopment that afflicted ordinary Muslims.

The Kashmiri Pandit Reform Association, established in the early twentieth century, itself reflected deep socio-economic and cultural concerns within the community.

This matters because reducing an entire minority to the caricature of a privileged elite became politically useful. It created a convenient social target and allowed legitimate grievances to be transformed into communal resentment.

The politics of exclusion

Abdullah’s political programme also had consequences beyond the central Valley.

The Gujjars and Bakerwals, Shia communities, frontier populations, urban political opponents and sections of the traditional merchant classes had interests that did not always fit comfortably within the political model emerging from the Valley’s dominant agrarian constituency.

The National Conference’s land reforms and social policies undoubtedly altered Kashmir’s economic structure and benefited many, particularly sections of the peasantry. But acknowledging those achievements without talking about its devastating effect on the small and marginal farmers under absentee cultivators does not reflect honest assessment of the situation.

A mature historical assessment must ask who benefited, who lost influence, who was excluded and who was silenced. That assessment has remained inadequate.

The real unfinished task

For decades, Kashmir’s political history has too often been narrated as though Sheikh Abdullah were simultaneously its protagonist, interpreter and moral authority.

That needs to change.

The history of Kashmir must also include those who opposed him, those who suffered under his policies, those who disagreed with the National Conference and those whose voices were marginalised by the dominant political narrative.

The same applies to the Kashmiri Pandit community. Its history cannot begin with the displacement of 1989–90, nor can its earlier experiences be dismissed through the convenient label of “privilege.” Its suffering, aspirations, contributions and political experiences are integral to Kashmir’s history.

And Kashmir’s history cannot be reduced to the Abdullah family.

The National Conference may have played a major role in the political history of Jammu and Kashmir after 1931. It cannot therefore claim ownership of Kashmir itself.

Kashmir existed before the National Conference.

Kashmir’s culture existed before Sheikh Abdullah.

Kashmir’s intellectual and social life existed before the Abdullah dynasty.

And Kashmir will continue to exist beyond the political fortunes of the National Conference.

Tanvir Sadiq and his colleagues should therefore stop lecturing Kashmiris about what Kashmir was or what Kashmiris should remember. Before attempting to define Kashmir for others, they should acknowledge the Kashmir that existed before their political movement—and the many Kashmiris whose voices their political tradition has historically sought to marginalise.

Kashmir belongs to its people—not to the Abdullah family, not to the National Conference, and certainly not to any political dynasty claiming a monopoly over its history.

The time has come to dig deeper, challenge inherited political mythology and bring the other side of Kashmir’s history into the light.

(Girdhari Lal Raina is a former Member of the legislative council of Jammu Kashmir and spokesperson of BJP JK-UT)