Is Modi-Putin personal equation becoming a quiet channel for peace?

New Delhi may not convince Moscow, but keep giving diplomacy its due

By TN Ashok

New Delhi witnessed a special kind of political theatre on the eve of the 18th BRICS summit of 11 nations in the Indian national capital by Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a much-hyped bilateral between him and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Modi and Putin met privately for nearly 50 minutes. Then, rather than immediately disappearing into separate official entourages, the two leaders climbed into the same Russian Aurus limousine and travelled together to the INNOPROM industrial exhibition.

It was a small gesture, but in geopolitics such gestures can speak louder than communiqués.

Optics is one thing both Putin and Modi have been adept at exploiting. Modi has met Putin three times – SCO meeting in Tianjin in China when India was under pressure from the US not to buy Russian oil or face 50% tariffs: his shaking hands with Putin and Xi Jinping at Tianjin became breaking news and dominated the front pages of western newspapers. He did it again in Bishkek – the three of them huddled together while the Pakistan Premier Shahbaz Sharif was chasing Putin for a quick aside.

It happened again, as Putin and Modi not only met for 50 minutes, but also, they travelled together in the Russian version of the American beast limousine. These optics not only grab front pages but also demonstrate strength and India’s sovereignty at not being cowed down by any superpower or capitulating to the demands of the US or NATO. Objective achieved.

The Modi-Putin relationship has acquired an unusually personal character. Their latest meeting in New Delhi was their second in 2026, following their August 31 encounter in Bishkek at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. Before that came their meeting in Tianjin in September 2025, the December 2025 annual summit in New Delhi and the October 2024 BRICS meeting in Kazan.

By any reasonable accounting, Modi and Putin have now met face-to-face more than 20 times since Modi became prime minister. The relationship has survived India’s growing strategic engagement with Washington, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Western sanctions against Moscow and the steadily deepening Russia-China relationship.

That history gives the latest encounter an importance extending beyond the familiar catalogue of defence, energy and trade.

What did Modi and Putin actually discuss? The official Indian account is deliberately broad.

The two leaders reviewed cooperation in politics, economics, defence, energy, space, skill mobility and people-to-people contacts. They discussed the India-Russia relationship within BRICS and exchanged views on the wars in West Asia and the Black Sea. Modi again stressed that conflicts must ultimately be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy.

There was also hard commercial substance.

India wants to expand trade and industrial cooperation with Russia and has set an ambition of taking bilateral trade towards $100 billion by 2030. Defence cooperation remains central, with Russian proposals reportedly including the Su-57 fighter and the upgrading of India’s Su-30MKI fleet. Civil nuclear cooperation, fertilisers, critical minerals and manufacturing are also part of the expanding economic agenda.

But the more consequential conversation may have been about Ukraine.

Modi’s message has become remarkably consistent. At Bishkek, he told Putin that the war must end and urged movement from an “endless war” towards the end of the war. Western agencies reported that Putin responded positively while Russia simultaneously maintained that any settlement would have to protect its own interests.

In New Delhi, Modi again said that dialogue and diplomacy were the way forward and that India was ready to assist peace efforts. The Indian government also specifically linked the Black Sea conflict to maritime trade and the safety of Indian seafarers. The repetition matters.

Does Putin have an ear for Modi? That is the intriguing question. No responsible analyst can claim that Modi persuaded Putin to change his war strategy. There is no public evidence for such a conclusion. Nor is there evidence that Washington secretly instructed Modi to deliver a message to Putin.

But it would be equally foolish to dismiss the possibility that the Indian prime minister has a channel to the Russian president that many Western leaders simply do not possess.

Modi has maintained direct contact with Putin without embracing Moscow’s justification for the war. He has repeatedly told him that the conflict should end through dialogue. At the same time, India has continued buying Russian energy and maintaining defence cooperation.

That gives Modi something unusual: access without subordination. It is precisely why the Indian message can sometimes be delivered to Moscow without sounding like a Western ultimatum.

The chronology is particularly interesting. After the Bishkek meeting, Russia said it hoped U.S.-mediated negotiations with Ukraine would resume. But it would be too strong to claim that Putin announced peace talks because Modi spoke to him. The available evidence does not establish that causal link. What it does establish is that Modi’s appeal came at a moment when Washington’s own diplomacy was again trying to restart negotiations.

That distinction is important. The emerging peace process appears to have three channels, not one: Washington-Moscow, Washington-Kyiv and the quieter network of relationships maintained by countries such as India. India’s value may lie precisely there.

The Western optics are unmistakable; Putin’s appearance in New Delhi is itself significant. Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, his international travel has been sharply constrained. The BRICS summit provides him with something the West has largely denied him: a major international stage surrounded not by adversaries but by governments seeking engagement.

For Modi, therefore, the optics cut both ways. A smiling Putin riding beside him in an Indian capital is bound to be noticed in Washington and European capitals. But it is not necessarily an anti-Western message. It is a demonstration of strategic autonomy.

India is effectively saying that maintaining a relationship with Russia does not prevent it from simultaneously dealing with the United States, Europe, Ukraine, Iran, China and the Gulf. That is becoming the defining characteristic of Modi’s diplomacy: keep every door open.

As it turns out, the 18th BRICS summit, currently being held in New Delhi on September 12-13, is considerably more complicated than the original five-member grouping.

BRICS now has 11 full members, representing roughly half the world’s population, while the broader BRICS partner architecture is even larger. The summit is therefore no longer simply a Russia-China-India conversation.

Its agenda is likely to encompass global governance, economic cooperation, trade, financial connectivity, supply-chain resilience, energy security, technology, climate and the conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia.

India’s chairmanship is trying to steer BRICS away from becoming an explicitly anti-American or anti-Western bloc. The emphasis is instead on a multipolar global order, greater representation for developing countries and practical economic cooperation. That is a difficult balancing act.

Russia wants BRICS to become a stronger counterweight to Western power. China wants greater institutional influence. Countries such as India, Brazil, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have little interest in turning BRICS into an ideological alliance against Washington.

Russia and China want BRICS countries to have trade in Yuan outside the dollar system of payments. India is not keen on this and so are the other countries who want to maintain the dollar payment system. Russia and China entered the Yuan payment system after Russia faced sanctions from USA led West. China does the same with Iran.

China has been dealing with Iran in Yuan and not dollar for the help it extends to the Islamic country at war with USA and Israel. China has its bank in Tehran, but where no one knows. US intel has been trying to identify the location and bomb it but not succeeded, intel reports say.

India’s challenge is to keep the organisation united without allowing it to become Moscow’s geopolitical megaphone or Beijing’s economic sphere.

The most important meeting of the summit may ultimately be not Modi-Putin but Modi-Xi. Xi Jinping’s presence in New Delhi is already historic. It is his first visit to India since 2019 and comes after the devastating 2020 Galwan confrontation and years of military tension along the Line of Actual Control.

The two countries have since taken cautious steps towards stabilisation. Troop disengagement, restoration of direct flights, easing of visa restrictions and renewed economic engagement have all indicated a thaw. But the relationship remains far from normal, with substantial military deployments and unresolved border questions.

A separate Modi-Xi bilateral would be highly significant.

The likely agenda goes well beyond ceremony: the border, military de-escalation, trade imbalance, market access, Chinese investment, visas, technology, trans-border rivers and the broader strategic relationship.

There is also a larger geopolitical triangle. Putin needs India as an important economic and diplomatic partner while Russia becomes increasingly dependent on China. India needs Russia but does not want Russia to become so dependent on China that Moscow’s strategic autonomy disappears.

China wants stable relations with India while competing with it for influence across Asia. And all three are watching Washington. And Washington is watching all of them placing them under greater scrutiny through its intelligence agencies.

The extraordinary frequency of Modi-Putin meetings should not be mistaken for sentimental friendship. States do not conduct foreign policy on sentiment. But personal access matters.

When wars become entrenched, diplomacy often begins not with an agreement but with someone whom the principals are still willing to hear. Modi cannot make Putin end the Ukraine war. Putin cannot make Ukraine accept Russian terms. Trump cannot impose peace simply by announcing it.

But if Washington wants Moscow back at the negotiating table, and if Kyiv wants credible guarantees, somebody will eventually have to persuade the Russians that diplomacy offers something the battlefield cannot.

India cannot be the principal mediator. It may, however, be one of the few major powers capable of talking to Moscow without closing the door. That is why the Modi-Putin meeting in New Delhi deserves attention beyond its photographs.

The real question is not whether Modi and Putin smiled for the cameras. It is whether, behind closed doors, a channel of communication is being kept alive that might eventually help turn the world’s most dangerous European war from a military problem into a diplomatic one. (IPA Service)