BJP’S Bengal victory and new emerging geopolitics of the east

Improving relations with Bangladesh a key programme for new govt

By M A Hossain

The urge to call it a “political miracle” is understandable. After all, the fall of Trinamool Congress (TMC) after fifteen years in power and the sweeping ascent of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in West Bengal looks, at first glance, like a sudden rupture. But politics rarely works in ruptures. It accumulates. It ferments. And then, almost quietly, it breaks.

West Bengal has seen this story before. In 1977, the Congress collapsed under the weight of the Emergency. In 2011, the Left Front (once thought immovable) was swept away by a rising populist wave led by Mamata Banerjee. Each transition was framed as a turning point. Each was, in reality, the culmination of years of slow erosion. The BJP’s victory in 2026 belongs squarely in that tradition. There is no magic here—only momentum finally reaching critical mass.

The most immediate explanation is anti-incumbency. Fifteen years in office is a long time anywhere; in Bengal, it is an eternity. Administrative fatigue set in. Allegations of corruption (from recruitment scandals to the notorious “cut money” culture) began to define the public conversation. Welfare schemes, once politically potent, started to feel routine rather than transformative. Voters, especially the lower middle class and youth, recalibrated their expectations. What had once been gratitude turned into entitlement—and then into disappointment.

But anti-incumbency alone does not deliver a 200-plus seat victory. Something deeper shifted. The BJP succeeded in reshaping the electoral arithmetic itself. Under the strategic direction of Amit Shah and the broader political messaging of Narendra Modi, the party executed a familiar but highly effective playbook: consolidate one bloc while fragmenting the other. Hindu vote consolidation (reportedly around 65%) combined with a partial fragmentation of Muslim votes, produced a decisive advantage across rural and semi-urban constituencies.

This is not new to Indian politics, but in Bengal it represents a profound shift. For decades, the state’s political culture prided itself on resisting overt communal polarization. That resistance has now weakened. The BJP did not merely import a national narrative; it localized it. It paired identity politics with welfare promises, offering larger cash transfers and development pledges that directly competed with TMC’s social programs. In doing so, it blurred the line between ideological mobilization and material incentives.

Equally significant was the party’s strategic discipline. Unlike its 2021 campaign—marked by overreliance on central leaders and personal attacks—the BJP recalibrated. It focused on governance failures rather than personality clashes. It elevated local leadership, invested heavily in booth-level organization, and targeted 177 winnable constituencies with precision. Even its cultural messaging was refined: the party consciously embraced “Bengaliness,” shedding the outsider label that had previously limited its appeal.

The result is more than a state-level victory; it is a structural shift in India’s political geography. West Bengal was one of the last major strongholds resisting the BJP’s expansion. Its fall effectively completes the party’s eastern consolidation, alongside gains in Assam, Tripura, and Odisha. This has consequences that extend far beyond Kolkata.

Geopolitically, the implications are immediate—and nowhere more so than for Bangladesh.

West Bengal is not just another Indian state; it is India’s gateway to Bangladesh. It shares a long, porous border, facilitates a significant portion of bilateral trade, and acts as a cultural and economic bridge between the two countries. Under TMC rule, there was often a subtle tension between the state government and New Delhi on issues such as migration, citizenship laws, and border management. That tension acted, in some ways, as a moderating force.

With a BJP government now aligned with the central government, that buffer is likely to disappear.

The first and most sensitive issue is migration. The BJP has long emphasized the narrative of “illegal infiltration” from Bangladesh. Policies such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC) are deeply intertwined with this narrative. A politically aligned state government in West Bengal could facilitate stricter enforcement, potentially turning rhetoric into administrative reality. For Dhaka, this raises both diplomatic and humanitarian concerns.

Second, border management is likely to become more stringent. This could enhance cooperation in combating smuggling, trafficking, and cross-border militancy—areas where both countries have shared interests. Yet stricter enforcement often comes with social costs. Border communities, already living in precarious conditions, may bear the brunt of increased securitization. Incidents along the border, even minor ones, can quickly escalate into political flashpoints.

Third, the economic relationship presents a paradox. On one hand, a BJP-led state government may accelerate connectivity projects—rail links, inland waterways, port development—that benefit both economies. The Kolkata–Dhaka–Chittagong corridor, in particular, holds enormous potential. On the other hand, if political tensions rise over migration or identity issues, these economic gains could be undermined. Trade thrives on stability; politics often disrupts it.

Fourth, there is the question of perception. In Bangladesh, India’s domestic politics are closely watched, often through a lens of suspicion. The BJP’s emphasis on Hindu nationalist themes has already generated unease. A stronger BJP presence in West Bengal could amplify these concerns, particularly if policy actions reinforce the perception of hostility toward Bangladesh or its citizens. This, in turn, can influence Bangladesh’s own domestic politics, where anti-India sentiment remains a potent mobilizing tool.

Yet it would be a mistake to view this development in purely negative terms. India–Bangladesh relations have, over the past decade, been anchored in pragmatic cooperation—security coordination, trade expansion, and regional connectivity. These structural factors are unlikely to disappear overnight. If anything, a more coordinated Indian political framework could streamline decision-making on infrastructure and trade initiatives.

The real challenge lies in managing the contradictions. A relationship that is economically interdependent but politically sensitive requires careful handling. For Bangladesh, this means adopting a strategy that is neither reactive nor complacent. It must engage with India’s central government while also recognizing the growing importance of state-level dynamics in shaping bilateral outcomes.

For the BJP, the challenge is equally significant. Electoral success brings heightened expectations. Governing West Bengal—a state with a strong political identity and history of resistance—will test the party’s ability to translate campaign promises into sustainable governance. The same forces that brought it to power—anti-incumbency, polarization, and high expectations—could, in time, turn against it. (IPA Service)