No end to protests against Islamabad at Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

UN Human Rights body has called for probe into killing by security forces 

By T. N. Ashok

Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) is witnessing one of the gravest internal crises in its 78-year history. What began as protests over electricity tariffs, wheat subsidies and governance has snowballed into a broad-based political movement demanding genuine representation, electoral reforms and an end to Islamabad’s domination of the territory.

The Pakistani state’s response has been uncompromising. Security forces have cracked down on demonstrators, the influential Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has been banned, internet and transport services have been disrupted, and regional assembly elections have taken place amid allegations of widespread manipulation and violence.

The developments are drawing increasing attention because they strike at Pakistan’s longstanding narrative that the people of Kashmir naturally favour accession to Pakistan. Elections are under a cloud. The latest assembly elections, conducted in phases because of security concerns, have been overshadowed by violence.

According to reports, clashes between protesters and security forces have resulted in multiple deaths, while protest leaders claim a far higher toll. Pakistan’s ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) has emerged as the dominant political force in the initial rounds, but opposition parties and civil society groups have questioned the credibility of the exercise. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), once the governing party in the territory, boycotted the elections, alleging systematic rigging.

At the heart of the controversy are 12 assembly seats reserved for so-called “refugees” from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Protesters argue these members often reside outside PoJK and are effectively used by Islamabad to determine who governs the territory. Critics say these seats dilute the political voice of local residents.

The Joint Awami Action Committee has emerged over the past three years as perhaps the strongest grassroots movement in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Initially focused on economic grievances—high electricity tariffs despite the region producing abundant hydropower, shortages of subsidised wheat, unemployment and inflation—the movement gradually evolved into a broader campaign demanding political autonomy and institutional reforms.

Its demands now include: abolition or reform of the refugee-seat system, greater local control over natural resources, release of detained activists, restoration of civil liberties, and free and fair elections.

Islamabad responded by banning the organisation and arresting several leaders, triggering even larger demonstrations. Pakistan maintains that the protests have been infiltrated by armed elements and accuses India of encouraging unrest—an allegation New Delhi has consistently rejected. International observers, however, have expressed concern over the scale of force employed.

The UN Human Rights Office has called for impartial investigations into deaths during the protests, while reports indicate prolonged internet shutdowns, restrictions on movement and extensive deployment of security forces. The crackdown appears to have strengthened rather than weakened public resentment.

Residents are angry. Unlike Pakistan’s narrative that Kashmir’s only issue is India, the current protests revolve around everyday governance. Residents complain that: the territory generates hydroelectric power but suffers long electricity outages; royalties from dams flow largely to Islamabad; economic development remains limited; and political authority ultimately rests with Pakistan’s federal establishment rather than locally elected leaders.

Many protesters increasingly question whether the existing constitutional arrangement offers genuine self-government. Islamabad is using this situation for political messaging against India. Some of the residents have called for Indian intervention. 

Even as unrest intensified, Pakistan’s political leadership continued projecting confidence. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif campaigned extensively, even saying he wished to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan-administered Kashmir if his party won the elections. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has continued reiterating Pakistan’s traditional position that Kashmir remains central to Islamabad’s national policy, making strong public statements about the future of the region. For critics, such rhetoric contrasts sharply with unrest unfolding on the ground.

Some videos circulating on social media and statements by individual activists have appealed to India or expressed admiration for conditions across the Line of Control. However, these claims are difficult to verify independently because of communication restrictions and competing information campaigns.

While there is documented dissatisfaction with Islamabad’s governance, it would be inaccurate to characterise the movement as uniformly pro-India. The dominant demands reported by independent observers centre on political rights, economic justice and greater autonomy. Here is the background as to how POK came into existence and Pakistan army is occupying the territory illegally despite a UN resolution asking for both forces to withdraw to their original positions. 

The origins of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir lie in the turbulent events following Partition. When British India was divided in August 1947, princely states were asked to accede either to India or Pakistan. Jammu and Kashmir’s ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, initially attempted to remain independent. In October 1947, tribal militias from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, backed by Pakistani elements according to Indian accounts and many historical studies, invaded Kashmir.

Facing military collapse, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession to India on October 26, 1947. India airlifted troops to Srinagar and gradually pushed back the invading forces. By late 1948, Indian forces had regained substantial territory. The conflict reached the United Nations after India referred the matter in January 1948 under Article 35 of the UN Charter. 

The UN Security Council eventually proposed a three-stage process: Pakistan was first required to withdraw its forces and tribesmen. India would then reduce its military presence to the minimum necessary for maintaining law and order. A plebiscite would be held under UN supervision. The first condition—complete Pakistani withdrawal—was never implemented. As a result, the plebiscite provisions were never reached.

The UN-sponsored ceasefire came into effect on January 1, 1949, freezing military positions roughly where they stood. That ceasefire line later became today’s Line of Control following the 1972 Simla Agreement. Many Indian strategic analysts have argued that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision to seek UN intervention before the entire princely state had been militarily secured allowed Pakistan to retain control over roughly one-third of the former princely state. Others contend that India faced military, logistical and diplomatic constraints at the time and that international intervention reflected the circumstances of the conflict. The historical debate remains contested among scholars.

For decades Pakistan portrayed PoJK as a model of self-governance. Today’s unrest presents a more complicated picture. Instead of protests directed across the Line of Control, many demonstrations are aimed squarely at Islamabad itself. The growing disconnect between local aspirations and Pakistan’s political management is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Whether Islamabad responds through political reform or continued coercion may determine not only the future stability of Pakistan-administered Kashmir but also the wider trajectory of the Kashmir dispute itself.

Nearly eight decades after the first Indo-Pakistan war, the region once again finds itself at a historic crossroads—this time not because of conflict between India and Pakistan alone, but because of an increasingly vocal population demanding a greater say in its own future. (IPA Service)