Can Terror Proxies Be Shielded Under Diplomatic Cover? When the World Becomes the Hostage

By Col Dev Anand Lohamaror

The debate over Iran’s regional strategy is no longer confined to the Middle East. It has become a question that concerns every nation dependent upon secure sea lanes, uninterrupted energy supplies, and a rules-based international order. The central issue is simple: can armed proxy organisations continue to operate under the strategic protection of a sovereign state while that state simultaneously seeks normal diplomatic engagement with the international community? This question has acquired renewed urgency as attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and around the Strait of Hormuz have affected not only the United States and Israel but also countries such as Bharat, whose prosperity depends upon freedom of navigation.

Iran’s security structure differs from that of most conventional states. Alongside its elected government operates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to safeguard the revolutionary system and expand Iran’s strategic influence. Over the decades, the IRGC has evolved into a powerful military, political and economic institution. Through its Quds Force, it has been widely identified by many governments and security analysts as the principal organisation supporting allied armed groups across the Middle East. Iran, however, maintains that these relationships are intended to support resistance movements and strengthen its own national security.

Within this framework, organisations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis have emerged as key components of what analysts describe as Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Whatever terminology is used, their activities have increasingly extended beyond local conflicts and now affect international commerce, maritime security and global energy markets.

For years, attention remained focused on attacks directed against Israel or American military installations. Today, however, the conflict has expanded into the maritime domain. The Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz have become critical theatres affecting the global economy. Since late 2023, repeated Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have forced many vessels to avoid the Suez Canal and sail around the Cape of Good Hope. The result has been longer transit times, higher freight charges, increased insurance premiums and significant disruption to global supply chains.

For Bharat, these developments are far from distant geopolitical events. A substantial share of India’s trade with Europe passes through the Red Sea, while a significant proportion of its crude oil imports transits the Strait of Hormuz. Any prolonged disruption immediately affects freight costs, inflation, industrial production and energy security. The consequences are therefore both strategic and economic.

Recognising these realities, the Indian Navy has significantly expanded its presence in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Indian warships have escorted merchant vessels, responded to distress calls, protected commercial shipping and rescued seafarers of multiple nationalities. These operations demonstrate that safeguarding freedom of navigation is not merely an international responsibility; it is an essential component of Bharat’s national security.

The Strait of Hormuz deserves particular attention. Nearly one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Even the possibility of disruption creates volatility in international energy markets. No responsible nation dependent upon imported energy can remain indifferent to instability in this region.

This raises a larger policy question. Can any armed organisation, regardless of its ideological justification or political objective, be permitted to threaten international commerce without inviting a coordinated international response? Freedom of navigation is one of the fundamental principles of international maritime law. Neutral commercial vessels should never become instruments of geopolitical coercion.

If non-state armed groups are allowed to impose costs on the global economy through attacks on international shipping, the precedent would be dangerous. Similar tactics could be replicated against other strategic chokepoints, gradually undermining the rules-based international trading system on which every major economy depends.

Bharat has historically pursued a pragmatic and balanced policy in West Asia. It has maintained constructive engagement with Iran while simultaneously strengthening strategic partnerships with Israel, the Gulf states and the United States. Energy cooperation and the development of Chabahar Port remain important elements of this relationship. However, these legitimate bilateral interests cannot diminish Bharat’s equally legitimate expectation that international sea lanes remain open, secure and free from coercion.

Another issue deserving attention is the distinction between diplomacy and proxy warfare. Every sovereign state has the right to maintain diplomatic relations with other countries. Dialogue remains essential even during periods of disagreement. Yet diplomacy cannot become a shield behind which armed non-state actors continue to threaten international shipping, civilian commerce or regional stability. If a state seeks the benefits of international engagement, it must also accept corresponding responsibilities under international law.

Supporters of Iran argue that the country faces genuine security concerns and decades of sanctions, making regional partnerships an important deterrent. Critics contend that support for armed groups operating across multiple theatres fuels instability and increases the risk of wider conflict. Regardless of where one stands in this debate, one principle should remain beyond dispute: civilian commerce and neutral shipping must never become targets of armed coercion.

Bharat has consistently supported a free, open and rules-based maritime order. The principles that India advocates in the Indo-Pacific must apply equally to the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. International law cannot be applied selectively according to geography.

The lesson for Bharat is equally clear. As one of the world’s largest trading nations and an increasingly important maritime power, India must continue investing in naval capabilities, strategic petroleum reserves, diversified energy sources and resilient supply chains. At the same time, it should preserve diplomatic engagement with all regional actors while remaining uncompromising in defending its maritime interests.

The debate, therefore, extends far beyond Iran alone. It concerns the future of the international order. If armed proxy organisations are allowed to influence global trade routes and energy markets with impunity, every trading nation becomes vulnerable. Today the target may be one country; tomorrow it could be another.

History has repeatedly demonstrated that commerce flourishes only when the seas remain open and secure. Bharat’s strategic interests demand continued diplomacy where mutual interests exist, but they also require unwavering resolve in protecting freedom of navigation, international law and the security of global sea lanes. No state, and no armed proxy acting under any form of diplomatic cover, should be permitted to hold the world’s commerce hostage.