National Conference under extreme pressure, may eventually break down

Girdhari Lal Raina, Ex-MLC

Notwithstanding its brave public posturing, the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference (NC) is passing through one of the most difficult phases in its political history. Behind the carefully crafted optics of unity and confidence lies an organisation battling distrust, factionalism, dynastic fatigue and growing anger among its own workers. The cracks that were once hidden behind emotional slogans and historic symbolism are now becoming visible in the open.

For the first time in many years, public protests and organised resentment against the party leadership are surfacing openly. One prominent rebel leader recently described the party structure not as “leadership” but as a “hierarchy.” The distinction is politically explosive.

Leadership is built on credibility, sacrifice, influence and the ability to inspire confidence among people. Hierarchy, by contrast, is merely a formal chain of command where authority comes from position rather than capability. In democratic political organisations, leadership evolves through struggle, public connection and merit. In dynastic parties, hierarchy often flows through bloodlines.

That is precisely the accusation now haunting the National Conference.

The anger within the party is no longer limited to ticket distribution or routine organisational rivalries. What is emerging is a deeper ideological and structural dissatisfaction. Many workers and mid-level leaders increasingly believe that loyalty, electoral contribution and political sacrifice have become secondary to proximity with the ruling family.

This is not an ordinary organisational disagreement. It is a crisis of legitimacy.

For decades, the National Conference enjoyed a unique emotional and political space in Kashmir. That dominance was largely built by the towering personality of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, whose mass appeal in Kashmir valley transformed the party into more than just a political organisation. It became an emotional identity for large sections of Kashmir’s population. Even opponents privately acknowledged Sheikh Abdullah’s unmatched ability to command loyalty and shape political narratives.

After him, Farooq Abdullah inherited not merely a party but an entire political legacy. Later, Omar Abdullah inherited that same structure. The problem, however, is that inherited authority is sustainable only as long as the organisation believes the leadership remains politically effective and electorally rewarding.

That belief now appears to be weakening.

Internal differences within the National Conference are not new. From Sheikh Abdullah’s era onward, the party has repeatedly witnessed tensions over appointments, ideological direction and political strategy. Some disagreements even assumed historic dimensions. Yet the first family of the party always managed to retain control through a combination of emotional mobilisation, organisational discipline and the political isolation of dissenters.

The system was simple but effective: dissent could exist, but only within limits. Public rebellion was treated as political blasphemy.

A toxic culture gradually evolved where critics were often socially cornered, morally demonised or politically delegitimised. Party workers learned that survival depended less on independent political standing and more on displaying unquestioned loyalty to the dynasty. This kept rebellion confined within closed rooms for decades.

But politics in Kashmir is changing rapidly.

The post-2019 political environment has fundamentally altered the nature of power and public expectations. Traditional emotional narratives no longer possess the same unquestioned authority they once enjoyed. Younger political workers are more impatient, more ambitious and less willing to accept inherited hierarchy as destiny. Social media has further weakened the old mechanisms of narrative control. Discontent that earlier remained buried inside party offices now spills directly into the public sphere.

That is why the current unrest is qualitatively different from previous episodes of factionalism.

The growing resentment against the functioning style of Omar Abdullah is central to this crisis. Both the government and the organisation are increasingly perceived by insiders as deeply faction-ridden. One of the major grievances within the party is that leaders who lost elections but remain politically close to the Chief Minister allegedly enjoy greater influence than those who actually secured the party’s electoral victories in the 2024 Assembly elections.

This has created a dangerous contradiction.

Those who fought difficult political battles on the ground increasingly feel politically irrelevant after elections, while unelected or defeated power centres are seen exercising disproportionate control over decision-making. Elected representatives complain privately that they are expected to maintain public support for the party but are denied meaningful participation in governance or organisational affairs.

Such resentment is politically combustible.

Even administrative decisions are now being interpreted through the lens of internal factional politics. The controversial decision not to fill all ministerial positions permitted under the Jammu and Kashmir reorganisation framework has further intensified dissatisfaction. Many insiders view it not as administrative restraint but as an attempt to centralise authority within a narrow political circle.

More importantly, the unrest is no longer confined to questions of power-sharing alone. A deeper anxiety is emerging over the apparent attempt to impose the fourth generation of the Sheikh dynasty upon the organisation.

This issue has created serious discomfort among senior leaders and grassroots workers alike. Privately, many admit that defending hereditary succession before the public is becoming increasingly difficult. Kashmir’s political landscape has changed. The public mood is changing. Even loyal workers now face uncomfortable questions from ordinary supporters: Is the National Conference a democratic political organisation, or has it in reality become a family-managed political enterprise?

The party leadership may underestimate the significance of these questions, but history suggests otherwise.

Dynastic parties rarely collapse because of opposition attacks alone. They weaken when workers begin losing emotional investment in the leadership structure. Once that erosion starts, organisational discipline slowly breaks down. Public rebellion becomes normalised.

Factional leaders begin building independent support systems. Eventually the party survives in name but loses its internal cohesion and political vitality.

The National Conference is dangerously close to entering that phase.

At present, one factor still preventing an outright rupture is Dr. Farooq Abdullah himself. Despite his advanced age, he continues to function as the principal balancing force within the organisation. His personal stature, political memory and emotional connect with older cadres still provide a temporary glue holding different factions together.

Ironically, the party’s dependence on him at this stage also exposes its deeper structural weakness. A modern political organisation cannot indefinitely survive on the residual authority of ageing legacy figures while failing to build a broader, merit-based leadership structure.

The larger political environment is also becoming increasingly hostile for the National Conference. Opposition forces are more aggressive, better organised and eager to exploit internal contradictions within the party. Public patience with traditional dynastic politics is visibly declining across India, and Kashmir is not insulated from that shift.

The National Conference today stands trapped between its historic legacy and contemporary political reality. It wants to appear modern while functioning through inherited authority. It speaks the language of democratic participation while internally operating through concentrated control. It seeks mass legitimacy while increasingly alienating sections of its own grassroots structure.

No political organisation can indefinitely sustain such contradictions.

The immediate danger for the National Conference may not necessarily be an electoral collapse. The bigger danger is organisational hollowing — a slow internal decay where the party continues to exist formally but steadily loses ideological coherence, cadre enthusiasm and political credibility.

History is full of powerful political movements that appeared invincible until suddenly they were not.

If the National Conference leadership fails to recognise the seriousness of the current unrest and continues to treat dissent merely as indiscipline instead of a structural warning signal, the party may eventually collapse under the accumulated weight of its own contradictions.

( GL Raina is a former Member of the legislative council of Jammu Kashmir and spokesperson of BJP JK-UT).