From Ottomans To Erdogan: Why Turkiye Keeps Its Eyes On South Asia – The Historical Connection You Didn’t Know

Separated by vast distances of land and sea, Turkiye and South Asia have been tied together for centuries by faith, power politics and changing alliances.

New Delhi: Turkiye’s interest in South Asia may seem puzzling at first glance. The two regions are separated by vast distances of land and sea. History, however, shows that this connection is neither new nor accidental. From the days of the Ottoman Empire to the policies of modern-day Ankara, Turkiye has time and again found religious, political and strategic reasons to stay involved in the affairs of the Indian subcontinent.

That interest has become visible again in recent years. Indian investigators claimed that a Turkish handler played a role in coordinating the November 10, 2025 blast at Delhi’s Red Fort.

Turkiye has moved closer to Pakistan and Azerbaijan and formed an informal defence partnership, which is often described as the “three brothers”.

During Operation Sindoor, India’s military offensive against Pakistan in May 2025 in response to the deadly terrorist attack at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir, Ankara supplied military equipment and shared intelligence with Islamabad.

These developments point to a renewed Turkish footprint in South Asian geopolitics.

The roots of this engagement stretch back more than five centuries, driven by a mix of ideology and strategy. Long before the rise of the Ottomans, India traded with the Roman and Byzantine empires, whose capital, Constantinople, later became Istanbul. Those ties faded after Arab conquests changed the Middle East.

When Turkic groups later took control of Anatolia and founded the Ottoman Empire, connections with South Asia returned in a different form. Turkic dynasties and armies went on to rule large parts of the Islamic world, including the Indian subcontinent. The Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire were both founded by rulers of Turkic origin. It made Turks familiar leaders in South Asian political life.

By the early 16th century, the Ottoman Empire had expanded across much of the Middle East and reached the Indian Ocean. It now faced powerful rivals – the Shia Safavid Empire of Iran and the Portuguese, who were building a chain of coastal strongholds from East Africa to India and Southeast Asia to dominate maritime trade.

As the Sunni caliph after conquering Egypt, the Ottoman sultan claimed leadership of the wider Muslim world. Religious authority mattered, but survival demanded allies. To counter threats from Persia, Russia and European powers such as Portugal and the Habsburgs, the Ottomans forged ties with states as varied as France, the Uzbek Khanate of Bukhara, Aceh in present-day Indonesia and several Indian kingdoms.

South Asia became especially important during this period. Ottoman forces worked with the Sultanate of Gujarat to resist Portuguese advances along India’s western coast. Their most lasting impact came through their role in the rise of the Mughal Empire.

At a time when gunpowder weapons were not widely used in the subcontinent, Ottoman artillery transformed warfare. Sultan Selim I sent commanders, soldiers, cannons and matchlocks to Babur, who was the ruler of Kabul. With this support, Babur went on to establish Mughal rule in India. Relations between the Mughals and Ottomans later moved between cooperation and rivalry, influenced by mutual ambitions and competing claims to religious authority.

As the Mughal power declined in the 18th century, the Ottomans once again gained importance in South Asia. They were the only major Muslim empire to avoid European colonisation and continued to claim the caliphate. Smaller Muslim states in India, including Mysore, looked to Istanbul for legitimacy and protection.

Under British rule, the Ottoman sultan held symbolic significance for Indian Muslims. This sentiment culminated in the Khilafat Movement between 1919 and 1922, when Indian Muslims mobilised to defend the Ottoman caliph and oppose British plans to dismantle the empire.

Even after the caliphate was abolished by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the idea refused to disappear entirely. The princely state of Hyderabad explored reviving the caliphate on Indian soil. The Nizam’s sons married Ottoman princesses. Historian Sam Dalrymple writes that in 1931 the Nizam “secured a deed from the last Caliph, nominating their grandchildren as the next Caliphs of Islam”. Hyderabad’s integration into India in 1948 ended those ambitions.

In the present era, Turkiye’s revived focus on South Asia fits into what many describe as a neo-Ottoman foreign policy. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ankara has sought to expand its influence across the Islamic world, especially in regions once touched by Ottoman power.

Erdoğan views the collapse of both the Ottoman and Mughal empires as historic losses. This worldview has strengthened Turkiye’s bond with Pakistan, which sees itself as inheriting the Mughal legacy.

Two broad motives now drive Turkiye’s interest South Asia. The first is prestige within the Muslim world. Strong ties with the subcontinent’s vast Muslim population and its Muslim-majority states enhance Ankara’s standing. In Pakistan, Turkish television, culture and political narratives have gained popularity. Many view the country as a model worth following.

The second motive is strategic. Closer security and diplomatic links with Pakistan allow Turkiye to display its defence industry, extend its reach into Central and South Asia, counter rival influences from Arab states and keep pressure on Iran (its long-standing competitor).

From Ankara’s perspective, these ties are less about hostility toward India and more about advancing regional ambitions. For Pakistan, Turkiye appears a dependable partner at a time when Saudi Arabia and Iran both seek warmer ties with New Delhi for their own economic and political reasons.

Relations between India and Turkiye is uneasy. Trade between the two countries is modest, and disagreements persist, from Ankara’s backing of Pakistan on Kashmir to India’s growing closeness with Greece and Armenia.

Turkiye’s interest in the subcontinent is not a temporary trend, but part of a historical pattern likely to continue as regional power balances keep changing in the decades ahead.