Analysis: Trump's push for Sharaa to curb Hezbollah revives fears in Lebanon, Syria
by Dalal Saoud · UPIBEIRUT, Lebanon, June 26 (UPI) -- U.S. President Donald Trump's repeated suggestions that Syria's new leader, Ahmad Sharaa, can better curb Iran-backed Hezbollah than Israel have alarmed Lebanon and Syria, reviving painful memories of decades of troubled relations, military interventions, and sectarian violence.
The disarmament of Hezbollah, which grew into the region's most powerful armed group through more than 40 years of Iranian funding and military support, has become an increasingly pressing issue, with Israel consistently calling for the group to be stripped of its weapons since it opened a front in support of Gaza in October 2023.
Although Israel retaliated forcefully and dealt Hezbollah significant blows by decapitating its top command and severely degrading its military infrastructure, it did not fully defeat the group, which resumed fighting in March after rebuilding its ranks.
Frustrated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's delays in ending the war in Lebanon and eager to finalize a deal with Iran, Trump turned to Sharaa to "deal with Hezbollah," arguing that he would do "a better job."
Such suggestions --made twice this month -- have raised eyebrows in Lebanon and Syria, where the two neighbors are seeking to open a new chapter in relations and heal longstanding wounds while avoiding further missteps.
The reasons behind Trump's move to involve Syria in dealing with Hezbollah remain unclear and open to multiple interpretations, ranging from an attempt to exert pressure on Iran and Hezbollah to growing frustration with Netanyahu.
Makram Rabah, a political analyst and history professor at the American University of Beirut, argued that Trump's insistence on involving Sharaa in Lebanon appears to stem from an idea attributed to Tom Barrack, "whose Orientalist approach can only make things worse."
Barrack, who is of Lebanese descent and whose grandparents emigrated to the United States in 1900, is the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq. He was assigned in mid-2025 to meet with Lebanese leaders and advance a U.S.-drafted roadmap for the gradual and full disarmament of Hezbollah, while pressing for political reforms.
However, this is not a mission that the Syrian President is willing to undertake, despite the good relations he has developed with Trump, as it carries multiple risks for both his country and Lebanon.
Sharaa has sought to assure Lebanon that he will not interfere in its affairs since taking power in December 2024, when his Islamist forces ousted longtime ruler Bashar Assad, a key ally of Hezbollah.
He even put aside what he called "the big wound" caused by Hezbollah's past actions when it fought alongside Assad's forces during Syria's 2011-2024 civil war and recently expressed readiness to sit at the same table with the militant group if that would serve both countries' interests.
Although he acknowledged a "deep problem" with Hezbollah, Sharaa turned down Trump's suggestion, unwilling to deploy his military forces against the group and instead favoring peaceful political solutions and economic cooperation with Lebanon.
He has been largely focusing on pulling his country out of decades of bloody civil war by reuniting it, rebuilding state institutions, reviving a ruined economy, securing reconstruction funds and investments, and restoring its regional and international standing.
David Wood, a senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group, said Sharaa has proven to be "a very pragmatic leader" and noted that any military intervention in Lebanon would be "unwise" not only for Lebanon, but also for Syria.
"Sharaa is trying to be pragmatic in terms of what Syria can realistically do in relation to Lebanon while also not dismissing Trump's suggestion," Wood told UPI.
He explained that the Syrian leader was referring to the same kinds of policies he would like to pursue in Syria -- stronger economic cooperation and increased efforts to resolve bilateral issues -- rather than military intervention.
The two countries already cooperate to combat cross-border drug and weapons smuggling, curb illicit drug production, and enhance intelligence coordination, but they have yet to resolve many lingering issues.
Lebanon had suffered from a decades-long Syrian military presence -- which began in 1976, shortly after the outbreak of the civil strife -- along with political domination and manipulation that deeply affected its governance, political life, economy and overall stability.
Syria also was accused of being behind the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and numerous other such killings during the civil war and in peace time. Its influence over Lebanon began to wane rapidly following the withdrawal of its troops in 2005 and the outbreak of anti-Assad peaceful protests in 2011, which soon escalated into a bloody civil war.
Syrians, for their part, harbor grudges against Hezbollah -- and its patron, Iran --for siding with the Assad regime and joining the brutal battles against opposition fighters starting in 2012.
Any new military intervention -- one that could potentially allow Syria to once again dominate Lebanon politically -- is rejected by most Lebanese, who are eager to regain their sovereignty and prevent a return to the troubled past.
More alarmingly, it could ignite sectarian violence between forces of the Sunni-dominant Syrian regime and Shiite Hezbollah fighters.
"No one in the region wants another flare-up of sectarian violence," Wood said, noting that Sharaa is seeking to reduce the prospect of Sunni-Shiite tensions and is relying heavily on Turkey and Saudi Arabia to "avoid going down that path."
One of Hezbollah's arguments for keeping its weapons -- besides fighting Israel -- was its fear of hardline Sunni Islamist fighters crossing the Syrian border to attack its positions and Shiite villages in eastern Lebanon.
Repeated attempts by Sharaa to stress that Syria is not interested in such an adventure are something the Lebanese have yet to understand and capitalize on, according to Rabah.
"There's only one way to disarm Hezbollah, and that is for the Lebanese state to fully assert its sovereignty -- something which is, ironically, also shared by the Israelis," he told UPI.
He explained that by doing so, "none of the countries would be used against each other to create any kind of chaos."
Rabah argued that playing the Sunni-Shiite card will not work at this particular moment, as the overwhelming majority of the Sunni world sees the disarmament of Hezbollah as a priority for reviving Lebanon and enabling investment to flow back into the country.
Hezbollah and Iran, which continue to promote a narrative of victory, are unwilling to accept the group's disarmament.
"During this war, Hezbollah has proven its value to Iran as a strategic asset right next to Israel by continuing to fight and survive ... even if it is not as strong as it was three years ago," Wood said.
As long as Hezbollah retains its weapons, Israel is likely to continue targeting the group and refusing to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon it occupied during the war -- unless the U.S. reaches a final deal with Iran and maintains pressure on both Lebanon and Israel to reach an agreement ending the war.
Hezbollah's arsenal is also a major concern for the Lebanese government, which has, since last August, begun adopting bold measures to contain the group, disarm it, and declare its military and security activities unlawful.
Government efforts have so far fallen short of curbing Hezbollah or enabling Lebanon to break free from Iran's influence.
If pushed too hard, analysts fear that Hezbollah could resort to violence and clash with domestic opponents.