Post-Orban Hungary would not expose Israel to more EU pain, though support may ebb
Longtime premier’s backing has helped blunt Europe’s ire, sparking concerns should center-right rival win governing majority, but his replacement is unlikely to significantly curtail ties with Jerusalem
by Nava Freiberg Follow You will receive email alerts from this author. Manage alert preferences on your profile page You will no longer receive email alerts from this author. Manage alert preferences on your profile page · The Times of IsraelSunday’s elections in Hungary, which could end longtime premier Viktor Orban’s hold on power, have raised concerns in Israel about what a new government in Budapest could mean for its standing in Europe.
Those concerns center mainly around Hungary’s role as one of Israel’s most reliable allies inside the European Union — often willing to break ranks to shield Jerusalem from criticism or punitive measures that require unanimity among member states.
Orban has repeatedly demonstrated close political alignment with US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and has often been at odds with broader EU policy. Over the past year, he made Hungary the only EU member state to join Trump’s international Board of Peace, and announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court, which in November issued an arrest warrant for the Israeli premier.
Netanyahu heaped praise on Orban last month, effectively endorsing the longtime leader who he said “has been like a rock.”
But while Orban’s support has been politically significant, Hungary’s practical impact on EU policy has been more limited than often assumed, and a change in Hungarian leadership is unlikely to radically shift bilateral relations, experts say.
Opinion polls have shown Orban’s Fidesz party trailing Peter Magyar’s upstart center-right opposition Tisza party by 7-9 percentage points, with Tisza at around 38-41%.
Despite Tisza’s poll lead, analysts caution that the outcome remains uncertain, with many voters undecided, a redrawing of the electoral map in favor of Fidesz, and a high proportion of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries who mostly support the ruling party.
Spokespeople for Orban’s office and for the opposing Tisza party were not available for comment.
A non-decisive role
While Orban’s government has taken significant measures to support Israel in international forums, its ability to block EU moves against Israel has affected rhetoric more than policy, a European diplomat familiar with the matter told The Times of Israel.
Certain statements condemning Israeli actions — such as high-casualty military strikes during its war with Hamas in Gaza — that the bloc sought to issue on behalf of all 27 countries were often blocked by Hungary, forcing EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas to issue them in her name alone, the official explained.
While “a statement… doesn’t change things on the ground as such, it is a sort of tool of diplomacy,” the official said. Hungary’s repeated objections have frustrated other member states, as “it looks bad for the EU if you can’t come out with a joint statement.”
On substantive policy, however, Hungary’s role is narrower.
The only concrete EU measure that Hungary alone has blocked is a package of sanctions targeting violent West Bank settlers and organizations that support them.
Kallas has repeatedly stated that 26 countries have approved the sanctions measure, and it is widely understood that Hungary is the single country blocking it.
Other proposed measures against Israel, such as suspending trade preferences, lack sufficient support regardless of Hungary’s position.
No radical shift expected
Officials familiar with the matter told The Times of Israel that Magyar would not be expected to significantly alter Hungary’s bilateral relationship with Israel should he win, though his government could shift Budapest’s behavior within the EU.
Tisza’s alignment with the European People’s Party — the EU’s largest political bloc — could push him to take a more cooperative stance in the EU, said Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, director of the Israel-Europe Relations Program at Mitvim, an Israel-based think tank.
A focus of Magyar’s campaign has been to secure approval from the European Commission for a loan of some 16 billion euros ($18.4 billion) for defense spending — a move that may require closer alignment with Brussels.
While this has sparked concern in Jerusalem, EU priorities may prevent that alignment from affecting Budapest’s approach to Israel. Brussels’ main priority is lifting Orban’s veto of a 90-billion-euro aid package to Ukraine, rather than the measures against Israel, according to Sion-Tzidkiyahu.
“So it’s possible Magyar might be more flexible on the Israel-related sanctions issue, because the relationship with Israel is important to him,” she said.
A policy more vulnerable to change would be Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC and support for Netanyahu and his Likud party.
If Magyar succeeds in forming a new government and a fresh Hungarian parliament is sworn in on May 12, he is expected to reverse Orban’s withdrawal of Hungary from the ICC before the move becomes permanent on June 2.
In doing so, Magyar would hope “to show the EU that Hungary is returning to the rule of law and to democracy — not necessarily liberal democracy, but one that respects international law. That matters a lot to Europe,” said Sion-Tzidkiyahu.
He may also seek “to distance himself from Netanyahu, who is very closely associated with Orban,” to send a “very clear signal to the EU and others that ‘we are not Orban,’” she added, noting that “breaking with Netanyahu could still allow him to maintain ties with Israel — just potentially with different political actors.”
The European diplomat cautioned against overstating the stakes of the election for Israel, saying that even if Magyar wins, “I’m sure Hungary will still be a country that is very sympathetic towards Israel.”
Other friends
A change in Hungary’s position would not leave Israel without allies in the EU, but it would complicate efforts to block certain unfavorable measures.
Countries such as Germany and the Czech Republic have acted as “partial firewalls” on certain anti-Israel measures, and Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria have shifted voting based on domestic politics, said Sion-Tzidkiyahu.
On key issues such as Israel’s participation in EU programs or trade relations, Germany in particular is likely to resist punitive steps, she said.
However, in areas decided by a qualified majority rather than unanimity, no single country is sufficient to block action. Preventing such measures requires a coalition of at least 15 member states representing 65% of the EU population, making large countries like Germany and Italy essential.
In that context, Hungary’s support can be decisive: when aligned with countries like the Czech Republic, it helps form a blocking minority, but without it, assembling such a coalition becomes significantly more difficult.
Besides the settler sanctions, however, most of the EU’s recent measures against Israel are tied to its conduct in the war against Hamas in Gaza, which have largely paused since the US-brokered ceasefire in October.
“As long as the [Gaza] ceasefire holds, there’s no strong reason for the EU to advance these measures,” said Sion-Tzidkiyahu.
Agencies contributed to this report.