Trump-Xi meeting changed nothing
by Yao-Yuan Yeh · The Washington TimesOPINION:
The recent meeting between President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping generated intense speculation about the future of U.S.-China relations and Taiwan’s strategic position.
Many observers interpreted Mr. Trump’s rhetoric, discussions over Taiwan and reports about delayed arms sales as evidence that Washington may be softening its commitment to Taiwan. Others argued that Beijing successfully shifted cross-strait issues from a “Taiwan-China” framework into a “U.S.-China negotiation” framework.
However, these interpretations fundamentally misunderstand the structure of contemporary international politics. The Trump-Xi meeting did not alter the basic nature of U.S.-China strategic competition, nor did it fundamentally change the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
Instead, it reinforced the enduring realities that define all three actors.
At the center of the debate was Mr. Trump’s reported suggestion that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan could become part of broader negotiations with China. Such statements understandably raised concerns in Taiwan because they appear to contradict one of the Six Assurances’ core principles: that the U.S. would not consult Beijing in advance about arms sales to Taiwan.
Traditionally, U.S. military support for Taiwan has been framed as a bilateral security matter rooted in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. Under Mr. Trump, however, the issue appears increasingly incorporated into a broader transactional style of diplomacy.
Taiwan’s arms sales have thus evolved from a primarily U.S.-Taiwan issue into part of a triangular strategic contest among the U.S., China and Taiwan.
Yet this transformation in style should not be confused with a transformation in substance. The strategic logic behind U.S. support for Taiwan remains unchanged. Taiwan’s survival outside the control of the People’s Republic of China, the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the security of the First Island Chain remain core to U.S. national interests.
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These interests are directly tied to America’s broader effort to contain Chinese regional dominance in the Indo-Pacific. For decades, U.S. policy has generally followed a proportional logic: As China’s military capabilities increase, Washington strengthens Taiwan’s defensive capacity accordingly.
Even if Mr. Trump treats arms sales as leverage in negotiations, the underlying purpose remains the same: to deter Chinese coercion and preserve regional balance.
This is precisely why claims that Taiwan has become a disposable bargaining chip are overstated. Taiwan cannot simply be “traded away” because the issue involves two fundamentally incompatible national interests.
For Beijing, unification with Taiwan is a core regime objective tied to nationalism and the legitimacy of Communist Party rule. For Washington, preventing China from dominating Taiwan is equally central to preserving American strategic primacy in Asia. These are parallel and irreconcilable objectives.
Indeed, much of the Trump-Xi summit reflected this reality. While both sides publicly displayed cordiality and diplomatic pageantry, the summit produced remarkably few substantive breakthroughs.
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China offered promises of expanded purchases of American agricultural products, greater market openness and cooperation on issues such as Iran and maritime security. However, there is deep skepticism within Washington regarding Beijing’s credibility. Its failure to fully implement commitments made during the 2020 Phase 1 trade agreement, as well as repeated unfulfilled promises under the Biden administration regarding fentanyl control and technology restrictions, has created a profound trust deficit.
Mr. Trump may enjoy the symbolism of dealmaking, but American policymakers are fully aware of China’s long record of strategic noncompliance.
This skepticism likely explains the unusual atmosphere surrounding the summit itself. Major U.S.-China summits typically conclude with detailed joint statements or clear announcements demonstrating areas of consensus. In this case, however, observers noted the absence of a meaningful post-summit press conference or major policy declaration.
Such silence is highly unusual in diplomatic practice and suggests that substantial disagreements remained unresolved. Public friendliness did not necessarily translate into private agreement.
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Taiwan remained a central point of disagreement. Chinese state media openly emphasized that Mr. Xi warned the U.S. about Taiwan-related tensions and the possibility of conflict if the issue was mishandled. Yet Chinese reports conspicuously avoided detailing the American response. This omission is itself revealing.
It likely indicates that Washington reiterated its long-standing position: maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait remains a core American interest, while the U.S. continues to preserve strategic ambiguity regarding direct military intervention. Such a position would hardly satisfy Beijing, but it also demonstrates continuity rather than change.
Mr. Trump’s own comments after the summit further reflected this continuity. His suggestion that China would avoid military action against Taiwan during his presidency but might reconsider afterward should not be interpreted as a formal strategic assessment.
In reality, the conditions under which China might use force against Taiwan have remained relatively constant for years. A Chinese attack would most likely emerge under one of three scenarios: severe domestic instability in China that threatens regime survival, a dramatic weakening of Taiwan’s defensive capacity combined with declining American support, or a much broader U.S.-China military confrontation that engulfs Taiwan in a larger conflict.
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None of these structural conditions changed as a result of the meeting.
Perhaps the most important takeaway from the summit is that the broader framework of U.S.-China competition remains intact. The relationship between Washington and Beijing today increasingly resembles a long-term hegemonic rivalry rather than a normal bilateral partnership.
Issues such as technological supremacy, supply chains, military dominance in the Indo-Pacific and ideological influence are not temporary disputes that can be solved through personal diplomacy. Even if Mr. Trump prefers transactional negotiations and dramatic symbolism, the institutional foundations of American foreign policy are remarkably stable.
The State Department, Pentagon, Congress and the larger national security establishment continue to view China as America’s primary strategic competitor.
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Consequently, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is unlikely to shift fundamentally. Strategic ambiguity remains the preferred framework because it simultaneously deters Chinese aggression while discouraging unilateral declarations of independence.
Likewise, America’s commitment to preserving Taiwan’s security remains tied directly to larger geopolitical calculations rather than personal sentiment toward Taiwan itself.
For Taiwan, therefore, the greatest challenge may not be uncertainty in Washington, but political division at home. Even if the U.S. remains willing to provide military support, Taiwan must still demonstrate its willingness to invest in national defense and deterrence capabilities.
Without domestic consensus and sustained defense commitments, external support becomes increasingly difficult to sustain politically.
Ultimately, the Trump-Xi summit did not redefine the U.S.-China relationship, nor did it fundamentally alter Taiwan’s strategic position. It merely revealed, once again, the enduring reality of great-power competition: Beneath diplomatic ceremony and political theater, the structural conflict between America and China remains unresolved, with Taiwan at its center.
• Yao-Yuan Yeh, Ph.D, is a professor and endowed chair of international studies and chair of political science, international studies and modern languages at the University of St. Thomas in Houston.