Letter to the editor: Washington removed two obstacles from Tehran’s path

OPINION:

In 2003, the U.S. removed two obstacles from Tehran’s western frontier.

It overthrew Saddam Hussein, Iran’s longtime adversary, and disarmed the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), an Iranian opposition force based in Iraq.

The decisions had different purposes, but together they changed the strategic balance in Tehran’s favor.

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The groundwork was laid earlier. Washington designated the MEK a foreign terrorist organization in 1997. The designation had no basis in law and facts. A day after the designation, The Los Angeles Times reported that a senior Clinton administration official described the decision as a goodwill gesture toward Iran’s newly elected president, Mohammad Khatami.

The U.K. and European Union imposed restrictions of their own in 2001 and 2002, both at the behest of the Iranian regime. Years later, appeals courts in the U.S., U.K. and E.U. struck down the designations, calling them egregious and perverse.

Former French counterterrorism judge Marc Trevidic has questioned the cost of these policies. Recalling France’s 2003 case against MEK members, he said the group once had substantial military capabilities that could be useful today in bringing down the Iranian regime. He added that France, the U.S. and Britain had all played a part in eliminating those capabilities.

His assessment cannot tell us what the MEK might have achieved, but it does raise a question about what Tehran gained.

After the invasion of Iraq, American forces collected the MEK’s weapons and heavy equipment. Saddam was gone and an armed Iranian opponent no longer operated across Tehran’s border.

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The path to that war deserves scrutiny. A Senate Intelligence Committee investigation found that false information from sources affiliated with Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress had influenced important prewar assessments of Iraq’s alleged weapons programs.

Los Angeles Times columnist Tim Rutten later discussed speculation that Chalabi had worked for Iran. That suspicion remains unproved; the Senate report did not establish that Tehran directed his network.

The consequences of the invasion are clearer. Iran expanded its influence in postwar Iraq, though the collapse of Iraqi institutions and other factors also contributed.

The lesson is that measures taken for immediate diplomatic or security reasons can give an adversary a lasting advantage. Before restricting an organized Iranian opposition group, Western governments should examine both the evidence against it and the strategic benefit Tehran stands to receive.

HAMID ENAYAT

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Paris, France