Afghan Taliban implementing restrictive policies against minorities, females and children, indicates UN Human Rights Report

DND Special Report

The fifth anniversary of the Taliban’s return to power following the Washington-Taliban arranged withdrawal of US forces has generated numerous opinions and useful analyses. 

Countries maintaining diplomatic relations or official engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban de facto authorities include US, EU, Gulf and SCO countries.

The SCO Bishkek Declaration expressed serious concerns over terrorism and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan. At the same time, the majority of SCO member states maintain working relations and operational diplomatic missions in Kabul, including China, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Iran and Kyrgyzstan, while Russia has already recognized the Afghan Taliban regime.

A deeper analysis shows that the majority of former ISAF countries are also engaged with the Afghan Taliban at different levels. There is a saying that every relationship is based on several questions, including three important ones: “What for?”, “Why not?” and “What is the country in question offering?”

Top diplomats understand why so many countries believe they need to maintain engagement with Afghanistan. However, the third question has an interesting answer.

For China, Pakistan, Iran and Uzbekistan, Kabul offers strategic land connectivity between South Asia and Central Asia. Afghanistan, however, does not produce enough food to ensure its own food security and remains dependent on imports. Its industrial base is extremely limited, much of its youth remains unskilled, and although the country possesses significant mineral resources, it does not currently offer the level of security required for long-term projects such as large-scale mining.

One important factor Afghanistan offers other countries, however, is the fear of becoming victims of terrorism if they completely sever relations with Kabul. Critics and security analysts argue that Afghanistan continues to host terrorist organizations and provide them with space for recruitment, training and networking. This creates a significant diplomatic leverage for the Afghan Taliban in maintaining and sustaining international contacts.

“In 2026, terrorist networks living in Afghanistan benefit from technological developments that were either unavailable or far less accessible in 2001. These include commercial drones, encrypted communications, social media, surveillance equipment and online financial systems”

Terrorism and insecurity therefore constitute a serious regional and international concern. International intelligence and security agencies have repeatedly warned about terrorist organizations operating from or maintaining networks in Afghanistan.

There are reasons to believe that the five years since the fall of Kabul have provided terrorist organizations with an extended period to rebuild and consolidate their networks. Such organizations have reportedly had opportunities to recruit fighters, establish training facilities, strengthen relationships, acquire resources and develop operational capabilities. Five years should not be regarded as a short period from the perspective of organizations that operate through generational networks.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) released a documentary celebrating and marking the fifth anniversary of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. Since the fall of Kabul in 2021, the Taliban has continued to face allegations of harbouring multiple components of Al-Qaeda inside Afghanistan, including AQIS, Al-Qaeda Central, elements of its senior Shura and military commissions, and Al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan branch, which has developed further over recent years and return of Taliban to Kabul gave Al-Qaeda its safe haven back. International security agencies, including the United Nations, have expressed concerns over the presence and activities of terrorist organizations in and around Afghanistan. TTP, Al-Qaeda, BLA, Majeed Brigade, ISKP and various Central Asian terrorist networks have been accused of exploiting the space available under Taliban rule.

Some intelligence circles in Pakistan believe that the abrupt US withdrawal demonstrated that Washington was aware of the deteriorating security situation and the potential for Afghanistan to become a renewed source of global terrorist threats. According to this view, the United States withdrew before it could be held responsible for allowing Afghanistan to become more dangerous than it had been before September 2001.

The subsequent five years have provided considerable time and space for terrorist organizations to rebuild capabilities and develop networks inside Afghanistan. Today, these organizations are not merely using Afghanistan as a sanctuary; they are also developing networks through which fighters, weapons, money, ideology and battlefield experience can move across organizational and national boundaries.

Some retired civil and military officials have expressed concern, informally, that the generational nature of terrorist networks makes the present threat more dangerous than ever. They argue that generational ties should not be viewed simply as “historic relations” because, over decades, relationships between members of Taliban, Al-Qaeda and TTP networks have, in some cases, developed into family connections through intermarriage. The Haqqani network provides one example frequently cited in discussions of these longstanding relationships. Jalaluddin Haqqani, a prominent commander during the anti-Soviet jihad, developed longstanding relationships with Arab jihadists, including figures associated with Al-Qaeda. His son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is now one of the most powerful figures in the Taliban government. Reports have also discussed alleged family connections between the Haqqani family and Osama bin Laden’s family. Similar claims have been made regarding family ties between elements of the TTP and the Afghan Taliban.

According to some intelligence assessments, an even more significant development is the growing ability of different networks to cooperate and share personnel, resources, weapons, financing, facilitators and operational expertise.

There have also been reports that Taliban authorities have provided Afghan identities or travel documents to foreign militants, potentially enabling some individuals to travel outside Afghanistan while concealing their backgrounds after receiving training, financing or logistical support from Afghanistan. If such practices are occurring, today’s Afghanistan is not simply a replica of Afghanistan in 2001; the threat could be more sophisticated and more difficult to contain.

In 2026, terrorist networks living in Afghanistan also benefit from technological developments that were either unavailable or far less accessible in 2001. These include commercial drones, encrypted communications, social media, surveillance equipment and online financial systems. Terrorist organizations potentially use these tools to test and refine their capabilities against Pakistan and, potentially, against other countries in the future.

These technologies provide relatively small terrorist networks with capabilities that were not available to them in the same form in 2001. Consequently, the current threat may be more sophisticated than the threat that existed before September 11.

The above-mentioned developments suggest that the international community should not repeat the mistake of treating Afghanistan as geographically distant and, therefore, strategically remote. Nor should international engagement with the Taliban be allowed to obscure the security challenges emerging from Afghan territory.

The central question five years after the Taliban takeover is therefore not simply whether terrorist organizations have returned to Afghanistan.

The more consequential questions are: What have these organizations built? Whom have they trained? What relationships have they established? And where might those trained inside Afghanistan eventually go?

For Pakistan, the issue is particularly urgent because the presence and activities of the TTP, BLA and Majeed Brigade inside Afghanistan directly affect Pakistan’s national security. At the same time, the broader terrorist ecosystem creates the possibility of a threat extending well beyond the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Five years after the fall of Kabul, the international community therefore faces a difficult contradiction: Afghanistan is being treated as a diplomatic reality that requires engagement, while the security environment inside and around the country continues to generate serious concerns about terrorism, militancy and transnational networks.

The question is no longer merely whether the Taliban can govern Afghanistan. The more important question for regional and international security is whether Afghanistan under Taliban rule can prevent its territory from becoming a renewed platform for terrorist organizations with ambitions far beyond its borders.