Afghan Taliban implementing restrictive policies against minorities, females and children, indicates UN Human Rights Report

DND Thought Centre Report 

Ready to celebrate 80^th Independence Day next year, a debate is currently gaining momentum in Pakistan about reshaping the country’s governance system and creating new federating units, commonly referred to as provinces.

The debate is not merely about drawing new boundaries on the administrative map; it is fundamentally about whether Pakistan can continue to be governed through a structure that many believe has failed to deliver effective governance and address emerging social, regional and civil demands for the population of 250 million because units were created when population was less than 120 million.

The debate, however, has also generated questions, fears and reservations. The most important concern is economic: can Pakistan, whose economy is already under enormous pressure without any remedy at sight, afford the creation of new administrative and federating units? A country that continues to borrow to repay previous loans and struggles to meet its financial obligations cannot afford an unnecessary expansion of the state apparatus. This concern is legitimate. But the question should not simply be whether new administrative units will require resources. The more important question is whether Pakistan can reorganise its existing resources, institutions and administrative expenditure more efficiently.

Pakistan already maintains a huge and expensive bureaucratic structure. If the country is divided into smaller and more manageable administrative units, a significant portion of the existing bureaucratic resources and expenditure can be redistributed among the new units rather than providing new resources to new administrative machinery.

One of the principal reservations is that every new province will require a new chief minister, ministers, secretariat, departments, offices, residences and other administrative establishments. At first sight, this appears to mean a substantial additional burden on the national exchequer.

But this assumption requires examination.

Pakistan possesses a large stock of government buildings, offices and residences constructed during the British Raj and subsequently expanded after independence. In many cases, these buildings can provide the physical infrastructure required by new administrative units. Instead of constructing expensive new secretariats, residences and offices, existing government properties can be reorganised and allocated to the new units. Moreover, why should be there the old practice of providing a princely state structure to administration such as SUVs, fully air-conditioned offices having air-conditioned attached powder rooms, durbans (gatekeepers) to open doors for offices and vehicles and public funded vehicles for families of princes (the civil administration that is officially ‘public servants’. If in private sector a CEO of multi-billion dollars can make coffee himself/herself in office then why do, we need an office boy to fill the glass of water placing in front of an Assistant Commissioner?

Similarly, the existing administrative staff need not necessarily be multiplied. Personnel can be redistributed among the new administrative units according to population, workload and institutional requirements.

Therefore, the creation of new units does not automatically mean the creation of an entirely new bureaucracy. The real issue is reorganisation rather than expansion.

Another argument against the creation of new provinces is that merely changing administrative boundaries cannot cure Pakistan’s governance crisis.

There is considerable truth in this argument. New provinces, by themselves, are not a magic solution. If the same administrative culture, the same generalist bureaucracy and the same methods of governance continue to operate under new provincial names, little may change. The reality is that, under the existing system of generalist civil administration, the chances of a fundamental transformation in governance appear limited.

Pakistan’s civil administrative structure has inherited characteristics of the colonial administrative system. The British Raj designed its bureaucracy primarily to administer and control a population rather than to provide modern public services to citizens. The colonial official was essentially an agent of the ruling authority. That mindset has not disappeared. A modern democratic state, however, requires an administration that treats people as citizens and stakeholders, not as ruled individuals.

The debate raises another difficult question: can the existing civil bureaucracy itself change its conduct and develop a genuinely public-service-oriented culture?

The answer is difficult to give in the affirmative.

The problem is not necessarily the individual integrity or competence of every civil servant. The deeper problem is the structure, rules protecting bureaucracy, culture and incentives of the system itself. A bureaucracy trained and organised within a largely colonial administrative tradition cannot easily transform itself into a professional, specialised and citizen-centred governance structure merely through occasional reforms.

Pakistan therefore needs to consider whether it should continue relying overwhelmingly on a generalist administrative class or introduce greater professionalism and specialisation into governance. Therefore, the purpose of restructuring should not be to create more posts for bureaucrats, rather, it should be to create smaller, more accountable and professionally managed administrative units capable of delivering services directly to citizens.

There is another serious reservation: new administrative units could simply become additional territories for existing political families.

This concern cannot be dismissed.

Pakistan’s political system has historically witnessed the influence of powerful families and political dynasties. There is a genuine possibility that political elites could attempt to capture newly created administrative units through their extended families, political networks and local influence.

But this is an argument for strengthening institutions, electoral accountability and local representation, not necessarily an argument against administrative restructuring.

If the existing system is vulnerable to political capture, simply retaining the present administrative map does not eliminate that problem. Political influence already exists within the current provinces that needs overhauling the political system through constitutional changes and introduction of “Proportionate representation’ can be one of the possible option because existing parliamentarian system is based on ‘electable’ those are capturing power in all system— from 1960s Basic Democracy (BD System) to today’s assemblies. The challenge, therefore, is to design the new units in a new political structure in a manner that prevents the concentration of political and administrative power in a few hands.

Perhaps the most important financial question concerns the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award and the divisible pool.

If Pakistan creates new federating units, the existing mechanism for distribution of resources will inevitably require reconsideration. A new NFC arrangement would be needed after the new administrative structure is designed. This could also provide an opportunity to correct an important imbalance in Pakistan’s fiscal architecture.

At present, the federation carries substantial debt-servicing obligations, including liabilities associated with past development expenditure, while a significant portion of development spending through the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) has historically been directed towards projects in the provinces.

Under a properly redesigned federal structure, the federating units could receive a proportionate and predictable share of resources and assume greater responsibility for their own development, by generating their own financial resources.

The objective should be to create a system in which provinces or federating units have adequate financial resources to manage their own affairs rather than continuously looking towards the federal government for development funds.

In such a model, there would be considerably less need for the federation to finance routine provincial development through the PSDP. Federal development expenditure could increasingly concentrate on projects of national significance; for example, interprovincial highways, rail networks, airports, strategic communications infrastructure and defence-related infrastructure.

This would allow the federation to concentrate on its core responsibilities while the federating units manage their own local and regional development.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s debate over new provinces should not be reduced to a question of whether creating more provinces will cost more money.

The more fundamental question is: what kind of state structure can Pakistan afford and what kind of governance system can actually serve its citizens?

If new provinces simply mean additional chief ministers, ministers, secretaries, offices, vehicles and bureaucratic posts, then the reform would merely increase the burden on an already indebted country.

But if restructuring means redistributing existing administrative resources, utilising already available government infrastructure, reducing unnecessary bureaucratic layers, introducing professional expertise, increasing accountability and giving smaller administrative units greater financial and managerial responsibility, then the economic argument against restructuring becomes considerably weaker because Pakistan does not necessarily need more government but it needs better government.

The proposed restructuring should therefore be accompanied by a comprehensive administrative reform: fewer unnecessary bureaucratic layers, greater professionalisation, performance-based accountability, digitisation, transparent recruitment and a clear separation between political leadership and professional administration.

The country cannot continue borrowing money merely to preserve an oversized and inefficient administrative system. Nor can it expect different results while retaining essentially the same governance structure and administrative culture.

New idea of federating units (provinces) is not, by itself the answer to Pakistan’s governance crisis, but a carefully designed restructuring of the federation, combined with genuine civil-service reform and fiscal decentralisation, could provide an opportunity to rethink the entire relationship between the state, its institutions and its citizens.

The objective should not be to multiply provincial capitals. The objective should be to bring government closer to the people, make administrators accountable to citizens and ensure that public resources are used for public purposes.

That is ultimately the test by which any proposal for new provinces should be judged.