Staff deficiencies, administrative breakdowns hit industrial governance

by · Greater Kashmir

Srinagar, Apr 5: If policy failures have weakened the industrial ecosystem in Jammu and Kashmir, the collapse of administrative capacity has ensured that even existing frameworks remain ineffective.

At the centre of this decline lies a stark and persistent reality chronic staff deficiencies and a complete breakdown of institutional cohesiveness within the Industries and Commerce Department.

The seriousness of any government towards industrial development is most visibly reflected in how it staffs and equips its field institutions.

By that measure, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir presents a deeply troubling picture. The District Industries Centres (DICs), conceived as the primary interface between government and enterprise, have been systematically weakened over the years through neglect, vacancies, and adhoc arrangements.

Under the framework of the MSME Development Act, 2006, and subsequent policy structures, DICs were envisaged as fully functional, professionally staffed units, led by General Managers and supported by domain-specific Functional Managers, Industrial Promotion Officers (IPOs), Assistant Extension Officers, Block Instructors and other field staff.

These institutions were meant to provide end-to-end facilitation from registration and approvals to handholding and grievance redressal.

In essence, they were designed to operationalise the very concept of Ease of Doing Business at the grassroots level.

What exists today is a stark departure from that vision.

Key positions across DICs have remained vacant for prolonged periods, with no sense of urgency shown by the Administrative Department to fill them.

General Managers arguably the most critical functionaries are frequently assigned additional charge, often to officers already burdened with their own responsibilities.

In several instances, a single officer has been made to oversee two or even three DICs simultaneously, reducing institutional leadership to a formality rather than a functional necessity.

This system of temporary arrangements has created a structure without accountability. When responsibilities are diffused across multiple assignments, ownership of outcomes disappears.

Delays, inaction, and inefficiencies become systemic, with no individual or office answerable for the consequences.

What should have been a responsive, decentralised facilitation mechanism has instead turned into a distant, overburdened, and largely ineffective administrative layer.

The problem extends beyond leadership. DICs have remained critically understaffed, with Functional Manager positions and support staff lying vacant for years.

The absence of technical and sector-specific expertise has severely limited their ability to guide enterprises, process cases, or even interpret policy provisions effectively. Entrepreneurs are often left navigating a system where the very institutions meant to assist them lack the capacity to do so.

This administrative vacuum has been further compounded by a lack of cohesion, both within the department and across its institutional hierarchy.

The coordination between the Administrative Department, Directorates, and field-level DICs has remained weak and fragmented.

Policies and instructions often travel downward without clarity, while feedback from the ground rarely travels upward with impact.

The result is disconnection between decision-making and implementation, with neither level fully aligned with the other.

Equally concerning is the absence of effective oversight.

The Administrative Department has failed to exercise consistent supervision over its directorates and affiliated corporations.

In this vacuum, different entities have operated with varying interpretations of rules and procedures, often driven by administrative convenience rather than policy intent.

For enterprises, this translates into unpredictability, inconsistency, and prolonged procedural delays.

Adding to this dysfunction has been the increasing centralisation of control. Instead of strengthening field institutions like DICs, decision-making authority has gradually shifted upwards, concentrating power with a limited set of officers removed from ground realities.

This has not only weakened local responsiveness but has also slowed down processes that require timely, decentralized intervention.

The cumulative impact of these deficiencies is profound.

An industrial ecosystem cannot function on policy declarations alone; it requires institutional capacity, clarity of roles, and operational accountability. When field institutions are understaffed, leadership is temporary, and coordination is absent, even well-intentioned policies fail in execution.

What emerges is a system where structures exist without substance – offices without officers, responsibilities without accountability, and policies without implementation.

In such an environment, the promise of Ease of Doing Business is not merely diluted, it is rendered meaningless.

The neglect of staffing and institutional coherence is not an administrative oversight – it is a reflection of priorities.

When critical positions remain unfilled for years, when temporary arrangements become the norm, and when no corrective action follows, it signals a deeper indifference towards the sector itself.

At its core, the question is inescapable: can ‘Ease of Doing Business’ exist when the very institutions entrusted with facilitating it are themselves dysfunctional?

In Jammu and Kashmir, the answer is no longer debatable, it is evident in the lived reality of its enterprises.