ANALYSIS: How US-Israeli Aggression Became Iran’s Windfall, By Gimba Kakanda

"What this war means, if it ends today, is that Iran’s victory lies not in emerging unscarred, but in altering the terms on which the United States can deal with it hereafter."

There is hardly any country on earth that could go to war with the United States of America and emerge untouched. Not Russia. Certainly not China. That Iran has managed not only to endure the weight of US and Israeli military pressure but also to remain standing as a consequential actor is itself one of the striking geopolitical triumphs of this moment.

That it could survive a country capable of invading a sovereign nation, abducting its president, and having him imprisoned within its own borders is a testimony for the century.

Iran has, of course, paid dearly in blood, infrastructure, and civilian suffering. But the losses have not been one-sided. The declared objective of the US-Israeli war was to degrade Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capability, and wider strategic influence.

Yet the conflict appears to be ending without the decisive outcome its architects sought, leaving Tehran with much of its leverage still intact. Iran is still central to the security of the Strait of Hormuz, with no clear indication that its missile capacity or uranium infrastructure had been comprehensively dismantled as claimed, and also with the prospect of eased sanctions.

Even more consequential is the political aftermath: the US and Israel confronted an Iran that contained citizens already disenchanted with their own government, only to leave it more unified by shared tragedy and, in many parts of the world, more sympathetically viewed by audiences long accustomed to Western depictions of Iran through the lens of threat and propaganda.

What this war means, if it ends today, is that Iran’s victory lies not in emerging unscarred, but in altering the terms on which the United States can deal with it hereafter. A paradigm shift in US-Iran relations now becomes possible because future negotiations are likely to be framed by a stubborn reality that Donald Trump’s war has weakened the credibility of American military pressure as a negotiating tool.

Washington may continue to display its immense military might, and no doubt it will continue to threaten force when diplomacy stalls, but such threats no longer exert the same coercive authority. The option of war has now been tested, and it did not achieve the political finality its authors desired. That, in itself, is Iran’s victory from this war if it ends today. The next round of talks, including the negotiations now being prepared, will therefore have to proceed less on the fantasy of dictation and more on the hard grammar of mutual compromise.

And then there is the information war. Decades of Western narratives about Iran have collided with a digital culture far less obedient to old media gatekeepers. On social media, especially among younger audiences, geopolitical conflict is no longer consumed only through the language of policy papers and cable news. It is filtered through image, style, virality, irony, and spectacle.

In that sense, this war has also functioned as a public-relations windfall for Iran, transforming it, in some corners of global discourse, from a familiar villain in Western media into a symbol of defiance against a great power.