Commentary: Even the world’s most powerful navy cannot simply restore safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz
The abrupt “pause” of Project Freedom after two days undermines confidence in the United States’ ability to secure the critical waterway, says defence professor and navy veteran Jennifer Parker.
by Jennifer Parker · CNA · JoinRead a summary of this article on FAST.
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CANBERRA: President Donald Trump’s Project Freedom lasted just two days. The United States mission to guide ships through the Strait of Hormuz supported only two vessels exiting the Gulf before it was suspended on Tuesday (May 5).
Iran had disrupted the critical waterway – through which roughly 20 per cent of global oil supply passes – to gain leverage in the war. Given the impact on the global economy, one question might seem obvious: Why has the US Navy, the world’s most powerful navy, not simply restored safe passage through the strait?
The answer is more complicated than either side’s rhetoric suggests.
In the opening weeks of the conflict, Mr Trump indicated he could re-open the strait with relative ease. He called on allies and partners including Japan and Australia to help provide naval escorts. They declined.
The assumption underpinning this was straightforward: Overwhelming naval power should be able to keep the narrow waterway open.
CONFIDENCE IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ
Despite political declarations and media headlines, the strait is neither fully open nor fully closed.
Commercial shipping has been deterred because shipowners, insurers and crews do not believe it is safe. More than 40 merchant vessels have reportedly been attacked or harassed by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman since the conflict began.
Adding to the uncertainty are Iranian claims that sea mines have been laid in the normal transit route through the strait. The Pentagon told US lawmakers mine clearance could take up to six months.
Iran has also directed ships to pay a toll to move through Iranian territorial waters, with reports this week that Tehran has unilaterally created the “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” to enforce its new transit rules.
The cumulative effect has been to sharply reduce maritime traffic through one of the world’s busiest international waterways.
GEOGRAPHY FAVOURS IRAN
The problem is that forcing open the Strait of Hormuz would be an asset-intensive and operationally demanding mission. The challenge of operating in this chokepoint is geography.
Iran’s position along the northern edge of the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman allows it to use relatively cheap cruise missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles and small boats to threaten shipping with very limited warning time.
US warships supported by airpower can defend themselves and limited groups of escorted vessels against these attacks. But doing so over prolonged periods is demanding on crews and rapidly consumes missiles that cannot be replenished at sea.
While there is no fixed ratio, it is unlikely a single US destroyer could effectively protect more than two or three merchant ships transiting the Strait at one time, particularly given the merchant vessels themselves have no ability to defend against these threats.
Any sustained escort operation would also require extensive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support across the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, as well as coverage of Iran’s coastal areas to provide early warning of attacks. Combat air patrols would need to remain overhead, supported by helicopters ready to respond to drone or small boat attacks on shipping.
Maintaining this effort over time would likely also require limited marine corps raids against Iranian Revolutionary Guard launch sites along the coast or on Iranian-held islands.
HIGH RISK, LIMITED REWARD
Even if a large-scale escort effort were feasible, it would only be capable of moving a fraction of the usual transit volume safely through the waterway.
Around 130 vessels normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz each day. Project Freedom managed two ships in two days, underscoring the reality that even a substantial military effort – involving warships, aircraft and surveillance assets – would not come close to sustaining normal shipping flows.
These realities help explain why Washington initially avoided large-scale escort operations, before announcing Project Freedom. The mission was intended to guide limited numbers of ships through the strait using destroyers, more than 100 aircraft and 15,000 military personnel – not to restore normal commercial traffic.
Even that limited ambition proved challenging.
Regional partners appeared unconvinced the mission could remain limited. Project Freedom was reportedly suspended in part after Saudi Arabia refused US access to its airspace and bases.
This likely reflected concerns that the military operation could quickly escalate into direct confrontation. Iran had repeatedly warned that foreign warships escorting commercial traffic through the strait would be treated as hostile actors.
THE LIMITS OF NAVAL POWER
Lost amid the geopolitical signalling is the plight of merchant mariners themselves, with more than 20,000 seafarers thought to be stranded in the Gulf.
A limited, but protected corridor, would have enabled more vessels and stranded seafarers to leave the Gulf safely. But that option has receded for now.
And so, they remain trapped, unable to transit through the Strait of Hormuz due to fears of Iranian attacks, with no clear timeline for a return to normal shipping operations and no immediate plans for the US or a multinational coalition to come to their rescue.
The abrupt pause of Project Freedom has added further uncertainty and likely undermined confidence in the US. Even overwhelming naval power has its limits. The events playing out in the Strait of Hormuz are demonstrating this in real time.
Warships can reduce risk and provide reassurance, but they cannot easily restore commercial confidence in a contested maritime chokepoint.
Jennifer Parker is an Adjunct Professor with the University of Western Australia Defence and Security Institute and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Lowy Institute. She served for more than 20 years as a warfare officer in the Royal Australian Navy.
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