Personality and Belief in Online Conspiracy Theories

Narcissism and anxious attachment predict conspiracy theory belief differently.

Reviewed by Monica Vilhauer

Online conspiracy theories are often taken to be a serious problem and critical challenge to democracy. Indeed, so important is the perceived problem that the education minister of the new UK government suggested that children will be taught to recognise and evaluate such online content: “…our curriculum review will develop plans to embed critical skills in lessons to arm our children against the disinformation, fake news and putrid conspiracy theories awash on social media.”¹ Whether or not this gets done, always a major "if" with governments, such views are premised on the suggestion that believing conspiracy theories results from a disorder of thinking: believers are intellectually impaired, and their thinking style needs correction. However, remedial approaches based on changing cognition are doomed to failure, as they misunderstand the aetiologies of conspiracy theory belief. Those believing conspiracy theories are not necessarily intellectually challenged, but rather can be damaged or dangerous or both – the problem, primarily, is emotional-social, not intellectual.

Understanding and tackling online conspiracy theory beliefs requires understanding three overlapping issues: (1) the psychology of those promulgating such views, whose motivations may be nefarious, monetary, or simply malcontented;² (2) the nature of the social media platforms allowing the rapid dissemination of such views;^3,4 and (3) the social-emotional capacities of those exposed to such views.^5,6,7 The latter is the focus, here, as a plethora of recent studies imply both narcissism and anxious attachment are associated with belief in online conspiracy theories. These studies suggest narcissism and attachment problems are associated with perceived challenges to the self, which believing in conspiracy theories helps to overcome.⁵ Without tackling the issues underlying these problems, belief in, frankly, weird online theories cannot be tackled – and certainly not by cognitive means alone.

Mirroring the broader social and political concerns,¹ research into online conspiracy theories has more than tripled over the last five years⁸ – some of it is very good, and almost none impacts policy. A recurring theme is that conspiracy theories postulate the existence of a secret plot between powerful people, belief in which reduces the complexities of experience, and makes a frightening world more easily understandable.^3,8 However, there is a wide variation in the content and nature of conspiracy theories,^9,10 and which ones are promulgated and believed depends on the digital platforms accessed,⁸ and personalities of the receipients.⁷

It has long been thought that belief in conspiracy theories reflects a delusional, schizoid, or paranoid personality style⁷ – a view dating back to Hofstader in 1964.¹¹ However, many recent meta-analyses show that many aspects of personality do not predict conspiracy theory belief as strongly as might be expected.¹² For example, in terms of the Big-5 personality traits: extroversion, conscientiousness, and neuroticism have negligible relationships with believing in conspiracy theories; while agreeableness has a small negative, and openness a small positive, correlation with conspiracy theory belief.¹²

It is when research moves beyond the Big-5 traits that the personality predictors of conspiracy theory belief get important.^6,12 One factor reliably related to not believing in conspiracy theories is intellectual humility.¹² There may be reasons why intellectual humility protects against being conned by a conspiracy theory. This trait means people are less likely to rush to judgement, less likely to adopt an all-or-nothing position with certainty, and are more likely to question themselves and take personal responsibility for any position (which is at odds with a prime conspiracy theory tenet that others are to blame).

As intellectual humility is typically not displayed by narcissists, narcissism may mediate the negative relationship between intellectual humility and belief in conspiracy theories.¹² This raises the question of why narcissists believe conspiracy theories. In fact, the adoption of conspiracy theories by narcissists may offer them various means by which to protect the self.⁵ Consideration of drives to protect the self, in all its incarnations – the individual (the drive to maintain uniqueness); the relational (the drive to form significant interpersonal bonds); and the collective (the drive to belong) – can help to understand proneness to conspiracy theory belief, and why narcissism potentiates this belief.

Belief in a conspiracy theory can protect the individual-self in two ways that may be important for narcissists. Grandiose narcissists can protect or bolster the individual-self by accepting theories that blame or criticise others for problems; while vulnerable narcissists can protect or bolster the individual-self through signalling their uniqueness by adhering to unusual conspiracy theories. Similarly, the collective-self may be protected through strengthening intra-group bonds by pathologising non-members as responsible for the ills of the world. In fact, this behaviour is highly indicative of "collective narcissism."

The role of the relational-self in believing conspiracy theories, however, involves consideration of attachment problems, rather than narcissism. The relational-self can be protected by adopting the views of others in the group surrounding the person, no matter how odd they may be, to reduce fears of potential rejection.^5,6 Some variants of attachment disorder are implicated in creating the rejection-avoidance need. Those displaying avoidant attachment are not vulnerable: they do not care what the others believe; and, unlike narcissists, do not need to put the others down to protect their ego, as the status of others is irrelevant to the status of the avoidantly attached individual’s ego. In contrast, the anxiously attached are not immune to the need to protect the relational-self.⁶ This could be considered as a core feature of anxious attachment. In fact, there is a reliable and very consistent relationship between anxious attachment and belief in, and promulgation of, conspiracy theories, which is not the case for those showing avoidant attachment.¹³

These drivers of the need to believe in conspiracy theories have nothing to do with a lack of intellectual capacity. Indeed, given the nature of some conspiracy theories, it would take a very intellectually able person to defend them! Thus, schemes to remediate such beliefs by teaching "appropriate" thinking styles may have little impact. These approaches may reflect a collective narcissism of politicians, who suggest we need protection from ideas that are not theirs, or more likely not their parties’, with reasoning something like: people not believing what I believe are dangerous to my group (and, therefore, to me), must be wrong, and must be demonised as deficient. Rather, what seems implicated in guarding against divisive conspiracy theories is understanding the factors leading to the psychological styles associated with belief in them – such as the social and emotional conditions in which children are raised. Of course, this places the problem within the remit of politicians, and does not allow politicians’ externality onto teachers. Given this, and the complexities involved, gaining protection may be a long road to travel.