The Modi–Putin Chemistry: Beyond Friendship, Bharat’s Role in the Changing Global Balance of Power

From the SCO to BRICS—Strategic Partnership, $68.7 Billion in Trade and a New Direction in Defence Production
By: Col. (Dr.) Dev Anand Lohamoror
International Relations & Security Expert

India–Russia ties are no longer merely a legacy of old friendship; they have become an important pillar of India’s strategic autonomy. The present Modi–Putin meeting on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Bishkek is their 20th meeting since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister. Modi has repeatedly travelled to Russia, while Putin has made 10 visits to India as President, the latest in December 2025. Within days, the two leaders are expected to meet again at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, underlining the depth and strategic importance of their partnership.

The strength of the Modi–Putin relationship lies not merely in the number of meetings, but in the trust maintained even during difficult international circumstances. Despite pressure from the United States and Europe following the Russia–Ukraine war and the sanctions imposed on Moscow, India continued its energy and defence engagement with Russia according to its national interests. In FY 2024–25, India–Russia bilateral merchandise trade reached a record $68.7 billion. India’s exports to Russia stood at around $4.9 billion, while imports from Russia were approximately $63.8 billion. These figures demonstrate the strength of the relationship, but they also highlight India’s major challenge: reducing the enormous trade imbalance. The two countries have set a target of taking bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2030, but achieving this goal will require India to significantly expand exports of pharmaceuticals, agricultural products, engineering goods, machinery, textiles, and technology products to Russia.

Energy is the most immediate and practical benefit of this partnership. Amid Western sanctions, Russia has remained a major source of crude oil, coal, and fertilisers for India. India has strengthened its energy security through this relationship and maintained alternative supplies amid volatility in global energy markets. In the coming years, nuclear energy, fertilisers, and critical minerals could become new pillars of this cooperation.

Defence remains the strongest pillar of India–Russia relations, but its deeper significance lies in how Russian technology has strengthened Aatmanirbhar Bharat through technology transfer, joint research, co-development, licensed production, and co-production. BrahMos, the flagship India–Russia joint venture, has grown into a major defence-manufacturing and export success and is now operational across the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with the Philippines becoming its first export customer alongside growing international interest. Su-30MKI multi-role fighters and T-90S Bhishma tanks are produced in Bharat with Russian technology, while the AK-203 programme at Amethi is moving towards complete indigenous production, with the first rifle made entirely from Indian components already test-fired. Naval cooperation spans aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, stealth frigates INS Tushil and INS Tamal, and additional Project 1135.6 frigates being constructed at Goa Shipyard Limited with Russian design and technical assistance. The Russian S-400 remains a crucial layer of Bharat’s long-range air-defence architecture alongside indigenous systems such as Akash, QRSAM, and VSHORADS, complementing the broader national Sudarshan Chakra air-defence vision. Russia’s role, therefore, extends beyond supplying weapons: it has helped Bharat build a robust ecosystem of technology, manufacturing, maintenance, and indigenous defence capability.

The next phase of this partnership could extend beyond defence into broader industrial cooperation. Railways, aviation, critical minerals, fertilisers, chemicals, energy, and advanced technology offer wide-ranging opportunities for joint projects. For Bharat, the ideal model remains Russian technology combined with Indian manufacturing capability and access to global markets.

Perhaps the defining strength of Modi’s foreign policy is his ability to balance competing power centres without compromising India’s strategic autonomy. At the SCO and BRICS, India engages Russia, China, and Iran while maintaining strategic ties with the United States and the West. Despite external pressures over Russia and Iran, Modi has protected India’s core national interests. This is not diplomatic ambiguity, but strategic maturity, making India an indispensable force in the emerging global order.

The SCO and BRICS take this relationship beyond the bilateral sphere and connect it directly with the global balance of power. India, Russia, and China sit together in the SCO, while the expansion of BRICS has increased its importance as a platform representing the Global South. India does not view these organisations as anti-Western blocs; rather, it seeks to use them to strengthen a multipolar world order. This reflects the distinctive character of India’s foreign policy—strategic partnerships with the United States, economic engagement with Europe, and defence-energy cooperation with Russia, without becoming part of any single power bloc.

Ultimately, the Modi–Putin relationship represents Bharat’s strategic autonomy and growing geopolitical confidence. By engaging Moscow, Washington, Beijing, and Tehran without becoming subordinate to any of them, Bharat has expanded its strategic choices. Energy security, defence capability, technology, and industrial cooperation are strengthening its national power. Under Modi, Bharat is not merely adapting to the emerging world order—it is helping shape it and emerging as an indispensable pole of the new multipolar world.