A British-made Nyan Maritime strike drone on Threod Systems’ Cata B launcher aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth. The Estonian launch system supported the Royal Navy’s first strike drone launches from a British aircraft carrier in October 2026. Photo: Royal Navy / Michael Allen.

What the foiled attack on Threod reveals about Russia’s sabotage campaign in Europe

by · Estonian World

The foiled attack on Estonian drone manufacturer Threod Systems highlights Russia’s focus on Europe’s defence industry, its reliance on criminal recruits and intelligence concerns about potential assassination plots, writes Holger Roonemaa.

This article originally appeared on Holger Roonemaa’s blog, The Baltic Flank, and has been lightly edited for clarity. Roonemaa and his colleagues are working on further investigations into Russian sabotage in Europe. If you have a tip, you can contact him securely on Signal at holgerroonemaa.30 or by email at holger.roonemaa@proton.me.

On Saturday night, another Estonian defence manufacturer – unmanned aircraft systems maker Threod Systems – was targeted in what appears to be a Russian sabotage operation. It was a classic arson attempt, aimed at setting fire to Threod’s facility in Viimsi, just outside Tallinn. The attempt largely failed, however, as the company’s security measures held up. Eight people were detained shortly afterwards.

That same night, an Opel car was set on fire nearby. Investigators currently believe the group had used it to travel to and from the scene.

This latest sabotage attempt is remarkable for several reasons and confirms several trends in Russia’s broader sabotage campaign against Europe.

Defence companies in the crosshairs

First, the attempted attack on Threod fits squarely into the pattern of sabotage targeting the defence industry. While Russia continues to target symbolic sites such as war monuments, its priority is companies producing military equipment, including supplies for Ukraine. In Estonia alone, this is the second such incident in two months.

As previously reported by The Baltic Flank – and confirmed yesterday evening by Margo Palloson, director general of the Estonian Internal Security Service, known as Kapo – Russia has roughly 10 specific defence-industry targets in Estonia.

Threod Systems’ facility in Viimsi, just outside Tallinn, was targeted in a foiled arson attempt that Estonian authorities attribute to Russian military intelligence. Photo: Threod Systems.

Second, Russia is increasingly relying on individuals with criminal records and organised crime backgrounds to carry out these attacks. As in the Milrem Robotics case, several suspects detained over the Threod plot have criminal records, according to information released by Latvia’s prime minister, Andris Kulbergs.

Why was another country’s prime minister releasing these details? That brings us to a third, troubling trend: disposable agents recruited in Latvia have been used in many of the most recent sabotage operations across Europe.

A Latvian citizen was involved in the attempted drone attack in Leipzig this summer. That was followed by the involvement of three suspects from Latvia in the Milrem Robotics arson attack in August. In October, two Latvian citizens were arrested for trespassing near an RAF base in the UK, although the background to that incident remains unclear.

A Milrem Robotics production building in Tallinn. Estonia says Russian intelligence ordered an arson attack targeting the defence company. Photo: Milrem.

Eight people were detained and five subsequently arrested in connection with the planned attack on Threod Systems. According to Kulbergs and Latvia’s State Security Service, the VDD, all eight are Latvian residents, four of whom are Latvian citizens.

All these incidents have occurred in less than four months.

Cooperation that disrupts attacks

To Latvia’s credit, the VDD warned Estonia that an attack was imminent. In its statement, the service said it had “carried out criminal proceedings at nine premises in Latvia linked to the suspects”. It seized explosive devices, pyrotechnic articles and ammunition, along with a large number of mobile phones and data storage devices.

This shows that law enforcement and counter-intelligence services can cooperate effectively and disrupt at least some of these operations. Another encouraging sign is that the perpetrators of every Russian sabotage and kinetic operation in Estonia so far have been caught.

One feature that distinguishes Estonia’s response to the Threod plot from its response to the Milrem attack is the immediate attribution to Russian military intelligence, the GRU.

Five Russian military intelligence (GRU) centres have operated against Europe for decades: the 73rd in St Petersburg, the 264th in Kaliningrad, the 74th in Smolensk, the 269th in Moscow and the 1194th in Murmansk. The GRU’s area of responsibility is estimated to extend 1,500 kilometres (930 miles) beyond Russia’s border, although its agents may also operate further afield. Source: Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service.

While the Milrem case is still being investigated as arson, the Threod investigation was launched under a far more serious provision of the penal code. It concerns an act “committed by an employee of a foreign intelligence or security service, or by a person acting in the interests or on its behalf, against the security of the Republic of Estonia”. A conviction carries a prison sentence of up to 15 years.

A border closure in response

More importantly, the Estonian prime minister, Kristen Michal, immediately announced that the country would close its road border crossings with Russia in response. This includes the Narva crossing, where long queues of travellers wait impatiently on both sides every day.

The government will formally discuss the measure this week, although the prime minister has already said he favours making the closure permanent.

The Narva–Ivangorod border crossing between Estonia and Russia, viewed from the Estonian side, with Russia’s Ivangorod Fortress in the background. Photo by Silver Tambur.

Closing the few remaining border crossings between Russia and the EU is a political decision, but it also directly affects Europe’s security. People crossing into Russia are routinely questioned by FSB officers, who take their phones and other devices to gather intelligence. In many cases, the officers attempt to recruit travellers as agents.

One European intelligence officer recently told me that, during these “interviews”, FSB officers have begun asking targeted questions about travellers’ knowledge of, and connections to, the defence industry. According to the officer, who was not authorised to speak on the record, these questions include requests for information about senior executives at defence manufacturers.

This has led intelligence services to two assessments. First, it demonstrates active coordination between the FSB and the GRU: the FSB shares intelligence gathered at the border with military intelligence, which directs the sabotage campaign.

More alarmingly, the questions about defence-industry executives point towards potential assassination plots targeting leaders of Europe’s military industry.