OP-ED: Iran nuclear crisis may shape North Korea policy
· UPIMay 3 (Asia Today) -- This column was written by an outside contributor and does not necessarily reflect the views of Asia Today.
It is difficult to predict exactly how the Iran war will end, but one thing is clear: If the nuclear issue is sealed through an incomplete agreement, the Islamic revolutionary government's enduring nuclear ambitions are likely to send shock waves in many directions.
Iran's nuclear program could shake the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty system, trigger a domino effect of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and intensify the "trap of escalation" between Israel and Iran, potentially sparking nuclear war.
The developments also may have given North Korean officials much to reconsider. They watched the United States' "Operation Firm Resolve" in January 2026, which led to the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, as well as U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, "Operation Grand Fury" and the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2025 and 2026.
Those events are likely to have a significant impact on North Korea's nuclear policy.
In this sense, Iran's nuclear program was a major reason the United States began the war, remains a difficult obstacle in cease-fire negotiations and will continue to affect the global nuclear order, the nuclear balance in the Middle East and security on the Korean Peninsula after the war ends.
No Iran-style CVID
If the Iran war ends, the nuclear issue is likely to be settled through an ambiguous agreement. Such a deal could allow Iran to maintain peaceful enrichment and reprocessing under the condition that it complies with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or require it to suspend those activities for a limited period. Iran's remaining 60% enriched uranium could be diluted or barred from use.
That would be the middle ground both sides could call a victorious negotiation.
Still, as long as Iran's theocratic dictatorship remains intact, there is unlikely to be an Iran-style version of complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement. Iranian hard-liners are likely to compare Ukraine, which was invaded by Russia, with North Korea, which has avoided a U.S. preemptive attack, and conclude that Iran was vulnerable to a preventive strike by the United States and Israel because it had not acquired nuclear weapons earlier.
Iran may therefore pursue a strategy of "honey in the mouth, a dagger in the belly." In other words, it may outwardly accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency while internally seeking to remain at the nuclear threshold, where it could withdraw from the treaty and rapidly arm itself with nuclear weapons if it made that decision.
The Iran crisis also has likely given North Korea several lessons.
Unlike Iran, which prepared a multilayered succession system in case of a supreme leader's death or incapacitation, North Korea treats anyone outside the Mount Paektu bloodline as a secondary branch. A leadership crisis there could trigger confusion and threaten the regime itself. North Korea is therefore likely to have been alarmed by U.S. decapitation capabilities and may strengthen systems to protect its leader.
Pyongyang also may reassess the power of underground-penetrating bombs such as the GBU-57 and review the safety of its underground military facilities. It is not possible to confirm how much damage was done to tunnels built 100 meters underground at nuclear facilities or missile storage sites. But if reports are true that North Korean technology was used to build underground facilities in Iran and for Hezbollah, and if Iran's underground sites suffered major damage, North Korea would urgently need to review the safety of its own underground facilities.
Most importantly, the Iran crisis could encourage North Korea to expand its nuclear arsenal.
Along with the war in Ukraine, the Iran war has shown that the direction of a war can be decided by stockpiles of ammunition, artillery shells, missiles and radar systems. It also may have reinforced North Korean decision-makers' belief that strong retaliatory power and solid nuclear cooperation with China and Russia can deter a U.S. preemptive strike and protect the regime.
Those lessons are likely to push North Korea to accelerate the qualitative and quantitative advancement of its nuclear forces and strengthen nuclear cooperation among North Korea, China and Russia.
Thinking again about South Korea's nuclear security
The impact of Iran's nuclear issue on North Korea's nuclear program is not positive. For South Korea, the implications again confirm the importance of extended deterrence provided by the alliance with the United States.
At the same time, U.S. support for South Korea's enrichment and reprocessing activities and approval of nuclear-powered submarine construction at the 2025 South Korea-U.S. summit were major achievements in nuclear diplomacy for the Lee Jae-myung government. Those efforts must proceed without disruption.
To do so, South Korea must make clear that its nuclear potential should not be mistaken for nuclear armament. It also must persuade others that, unlike enrichment and reprocessing by hostile states, an ally's nuclear potential is a strategic asset that contributes to the regional and Korean Peninsula strategic balance sought by the United States.
In short, South Korea must view the Iran crisis objectively while prioritizing its national interests. In the Strait of Hormuz crisis, it is important for South Korea to avoid building hostility with Iran. But seeking ways to support an ally must come first.
The country that can help South Korea fight in a Korean Peninsula crisis is the United States. Economic ties with Iran are extremely valuable, but they cannot come before security interests. That becomes even clearer when nuclear security is considered.
Kim Tae-woo, Director of the Nuclear Security Research Division at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs
※ The views expressed in this column may differ from those of this publication.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
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Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260428010008830