Sajid Akram and Naveed Akram in the recent mass shooting at Sydney’s Bondi Beach (Photo: autraliatoday)

Spotlight on ISIS Sleeper Cells and the Challenge of Radicalisation

by · TFIPOST.com

The alleged role of a terror-indoctrinated Indian, Sajid Akram, in the recent mass shooting at Sydney’s Bondi Beach that claimed 15 lives is a deeply disturbing development.

It not only exposes the global reach of extremist ideologies but also points to the worrying undercurrents of radicalisation that continue to target vulnerable individuals from India.

Sajid Akram, born in Hyderabad around five decades ago, left home at a young age to seek employment overseas. His travels took him across West Asia and Pakistan, where investigators believe he was indoctrinated into the violent ideology of the Islamic State (ISIS).

Over time, Sajid is said to have passed on these extremist beliefs to his son, Naveed, who has since been captured and is currently being interrogated by Australian authorities.

Initial suspicions about Sajid’s nationality were laid to rest after his Indian passport confirmed his roots in Hyderabad. Acting swiftly, the Telangana police traced his background and made public all relevant details, effectively dispelling speculation and misinformation.

According to police records, Sajid left Hyderabad in 1998 and returned only six times thereafter. He had no criminal antecedents in the city, reinforcing the assessment that his radicalisation occurred abroad rather than on Indian soil.

Investigators believe Sajid’s transformation was the result of sustained exposure to extremist networks in West Asia and Pakistan—an established modus operandi of ISIS to recruit Indians working overseas.

Despite its global footprint, ISIS found limited resonance among Indian Muslims within the country, compelling the organisation to shift focus to Indians living and working abroad, who could be more susceptible to radical influences in conflict-prone regions.

Founded in 2006, ISIS is a transnational Salafi-jihadist militant organisation that has drawn recruits from across the world. In India, its recruitment strategy has largely revolved around online radicalisation, small and tightly knit modules, experimentation with improvised explosive devices, the use of handlers, and clandestine fund-raising channels.

In most Indian cases linked to ISIS, sleeper cells have typically comprised fewer than ten individuals, operating quietly to avoid detection.

The real concern, however, lies in the gradual proliferation of such sleeper cells. Even small, isolated groups can cause disproportionate damage, as recent global incidents have shown.

This underscores the urgent need for constant vigilance and proactive counter-radicalisation efforts.

Indian Muslims, who have overwhelmingly rejected extremist ideologies, must remain alert to attempts by global terror networks to draw them into a violent agenda that has nothing to do with their faith or the country’s social fabric.

At the same time, the government bears a critical responsibility to support communities through intelligence-sharing, outreach, and de-radicalisation initiatives.

Preventing the spread of extremist ideologies is not just a security imperative—it is essential to safeguarding India’s pluralistic and democratic ethos.