China’s joint security proposal sparks controversy in Myanmar

WASHINGTON — China’s recent proposal to establish a joint security company with Myanmar’s military junta has drawn sharp criticism from those who view it as an encroachment on national sovereignty and a sign of the junta’s inability to ensure security.

According to a report in the Myanmar Gazette published on November 8, the junta formed a 13-member committee on Oct. 22 to review China’s proposal and draft a memorandum of understanding for the joint venture.

The committee evaluated the logistical aspects of the draft MOU, such as importing weapons and security equipment, while ensuring the plan does not undermine Myanmar’s sovereignty.

Myanmar observers believe the proposal may have been prompted by the Oct. 18 bombing of its consulate in Mandalay, highlighting Beijing’s growing concerns over its investments in Myanmar’s unstable political environment.

A question of sovereignty and security

“China’s top priority in Myanmar is stability for its Belt and Road Initiative projects,” according to a Myanmar scholar who requested anonymity for safety concerns of his family in Myanmar. “The junta’s failure to control the revolution has forced China to explore alternative measures,” he added.

The scholar explained that because Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution, drafted by the military, prohibits the deployment of foreign troops on its soil, the referencing of a Chinese “company” in the proposed joint venture is a strategic move “to avoid accusations of military intervention.”

“But the public perceives it as a breach of sovereignty, and even the junta would be uncomfortable with such overt Chinese involvement,” he said.

The proposal indicates Beijing’s lack of confidence in the junta’s ability to maintain control and security.

Regime’s lack of control

Chinese projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), including the oil and gas pipelines, have faced increasing threats since the opposition declared a “People’s Defensive War” in 2021.

“The limitations of both the SAC and the NUG have jeopardized the CMEC,” said Kyi Sin, a research officer at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. In his paper Securing the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Navigating Conflicts and Public Skepticism, Kyi cited the January 2022 attack on the $800 million Tagaung Taung nickel-processing plant by a local People’s Defense Force as a stark example.

According to Jason Tower, Burma country director at the United States Institute of Peace, the Myanmar military has shown signs of weakening control.

Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city and a major commercial hub, was the site of an attack on October 18, which occurred during the day, raising questions about the regime’s security capabilities. China responded swiftly, saying it was “deeply shocked at the attack and strongly condemns it.”

China’s balancing act and mounting challenges

China’s involvement in Myanmar since the 2021 coup has been a delicate balancing act, according to Thomas Kean, a senior consultant on Myanmar and Bangladesh at the International Crisis Group. While Beijing has provided economic, diplomatic, and military support to the junta, it has also maintained relationships with ethnic armed organizations and opposition groups, underscoring its strategic interest in stability.

However, Beijing's approach shifted as the military lost control of significant territories.

“They don’t want to see a disorderly collapse in Myanmar; they feel compelled to get involved,” Kean said. “It’s not something they want to do. Like the first few years after the coup, they really tried not to get too involved. And I think that’s their preferred position.”

Kean explained that China’s recent military support, including the supply of combat aircraft, reflects its concerns about the junta’s inability to maintain order. While this involvement aims to safeguard China’s investments and projects, it has drawn sharp criticism from Myanmar’s citizens and resistance groups, complicating Beijing’s position further.

“The military's grip is somewhat tenuous,” Kean said of the junta.

Overstretched junta forces

Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a security expert on Southeast Asia and research fellow at the Lowy Institute, highlighted the junta’s overstretched military and security capacity.

“The junta forces are actually overstretched,” Yaacob said. “That’s the reason why they are looking at conscripts to support the numbers. But numbers don’t mean you have good quality. The junta is fighting across multiple fronts in the south, north, and border areas. They don’t have enough forces, actually, to provide comprehensive security.”

He noted a significant shift in the dynamics of the conflict. “What we are seeing now is that opposition or rebel groups are able to start operating within the city area, targeting government interests there,” Yaacob said.

A complex future

While the junta’s inability to provide security highlights its weakening grip, experts caution that the introduction of Chinese security forces could further complicate Myanmar’s political landscape.

“The proposed joint security company poses challenges for both revolutionary forces and ethnic armed organizations,” the Myanmar scholar said. “It’s crucial for opposition groups to prepare for this scenario.”

As China deepens its involvement in Myanmar, it risks alienating not only the public but also regional powers like India. The question remains whether Beijing can achieve its goal of stability without becoming further entangled in Myanmar’s conflict.

“Beijing will have to consider its economic interest in the long term versus its need to support the junta in the short and medium term,” Yaacob said.